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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of moral hazard in banking is hardly new. Ever since the
strengthening of lender-of-last-resort support for banking system stability, along with
government deposit insurance for banks, the public has grown increasingly confident
that most banks should not be allowed to fail.' The evolution of modern macroeco-
nomic policy (from Marriner Eccles and early Keynesian pump priming, through
mild post-World War II Neo-Keynesian deficit stimulus, and into supply-side deficits
during the 1980s) further strengthened a general belief that governments cannot
afford to let their banking systems and most major banks fail. 2 Inevitably, bank
managers could place growing reliance on this network of support for overall
economic prosperity and their own institution's relative security. In this way,
however, the normal marketplace disciplines against inadequate management-what
many refer to as "moral hazard"-could be significantly weakened. If governments
and modern nations do not allow most banks to default on their deposit liabilities,
how can the leaders and managements of banking institutions be disciplined and
avoid unduly risky, negligent, or adventurous lending policies (or simply poor
asset-liability management)? 3
During the later 1970s to the early 1980s, some giant bank leaders began to
suggest that the largest banks were so big, so well-staffed, and so broadly diversified
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I. See, e.g., C. GOLEMBE & D. HoLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 1986-87, at 109-28 (1986); C.
HEN sr:, W. PIGoT & R. Scorr, FNANCIAL MRKETS AND TmE EcoNoMY 90-106 (4th ed. 1984) [hereinafter C. Hms];
D. KrwL. & R. PETERoN, FINANCiAL Issmun-noNs, MARKurs, AND MONEY 215-18, 415-20 (3d ed. 1988); N. LASH,
BANKING LAWS AND REGULATIONS 22-23 (1987); W. LovEmr, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INsrrrTIJONS LAW 122-28 (2d ed.
1988) [hereinafter W. LovErr, BANI ]; M. MA.oY, 1 THE CORPORATE LAw OF BANKS § 1.3.3 (1988 & Supp. 1988);
T. MAYER, J. DIsEENBERRY & R. ALaa, MONEY, BANKING, AND THE ECONOMY 22-24 (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter T.
MAYER]. For summaries of applicable U.S. economic history, see generally J. GALIBAITH, MoNEY 134-282 (1975); S.
H-vIAN, MARRINER S.Ecc:LEs (1976); M. MYERS, A FiNANCrAL HISTORY OF TE U.S. 287-314 (1970); P. STUDENSKI & H.
KRoos, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 302-568 (2d ed. 1963). For further information on bank risks, failures,
and regulatory strategies, see generally G. BENsToN, R. EtsENEis, P. HoRvnz, E. KANE & G. KAUFMAu, PERSPE nTVES ON
SAFE AND SOUND BANKING 28-33 (1986) [hereinafter G. BENSTON]; R. DALE, TiE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING
(1984); I. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT 242-48 (1986); J. WELcH, TiE REGULATION OF BANKS IN Tm MEMBER STATES OF THE EEC
(2d ed. 1981); UK BANKIG SUPERvisioN (E. Gardener ed. 1986).
2. See, e.g., G. BENsroN, supra note 1, at 28-33; R. DALE, supra note 1, at 53-87; J. GALRAS, supra note
1, at 134-282; D. KIDwEIL & R. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 535-56; W. LovErr, BANKG, supra note 1, at 55-56,
122-28; T. MAYER, supra note 1, at 374-99; I. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 242-48; P. SIUDoESKI & H. KRoos, supra note
1, at 403-568. See also C. GOLBIBE & D. HOLLAND, supra note 1, at 109-28; C. HENNING, supra note 1, at 542-53; N.
LAsh, supra note 1, at 9-17; M. MYERS, supra note 1, at 378-91; A General Perspective of Banking Prudential
Regulation, in UK BANNG REGULATION 25 (E. Gardener ed. 1986) [hereinafter General Perspective]; see generally S.
Hmt.AN, supra note 1; J. VELcH, supra note 1.
3. For helpful discussion of the moral hazard regulation dilemma, see, e.g., G. BENsToN, supra note 1, at
246-48; D. KVWEU.L & R. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 410-18; N. LASH, supra note 1, at 102-25; W. Lov-rr, BANKING,
supra note 1, at 118-28; T. MAYER, supra note 1, at 35-39; 1. SPRAGUE, supra note I, at 18-19, 231-65.
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that they could not possibly fail.4 Further, they asserted that "governments could
never default" on their loans to big international banks, so that a growing bonanza
of international deposits (from spreading MNE (multinational enterprise) activities,
tax-havens, and petro-dollars) was immune to problems of credit risk in the hands of
giant multinational banks. Such hubris deserved a comeuppance, of course, and it
was repaid rather generously. It became obvious in the fall of 1982 that most of the
biggest U.S. banks (and some leading foreign banks) were badly over-exposed to
Latin American and other developing country debt overloads. In fact, if these
developing countries all defaulted together on their external obligations, most of the
top ten U.S. banks would be insolvent (because their outstanding LDC (less
developed country) loans substantially exceeded equity capital).5 Although federal
bank regulators had allowed Penn Square Bank ($200 million in assets) to fail in the
summer of 1982 without protecting uninsured depositors, as a lesson and warning to
"higher flying" banks and big depositors, Continental Illinois Bank ($42 billion in
assets and 7th largest in the nation) proved "too big to fail" in 1983.6 Continental
Illinois received a $4.5 billion FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) bailout,
and the government guaranteed all depositors (regardless of size). The Federal
Reserve, FDIC, and OCC (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) quite properly
decided that no major U.S. money center bank could be allowed to fail and inflict
massive losses upon foreign and domestic depositors. The integrity of the U.S.
4. For the most complete analyses and listings of bank failures, see G. BEN ToN, supra note 1, at 1-78; w.
Lovarr, BANKING, supra note 1, at 122-28; I. SPRAGtE, supra note 1, at 265-70. For discussion of the optimism and
overconfidence of large multinational banks at the peak of the international banking boom, see, e.g., S. DAvis, THE
EuRO-BANK 136-49 (2d ed. 1980); M. MENDELSOHN, MONEY ON THE MOvE 122-35 (1980); Lovett, Managing the World
Debt Crisis: Economic Strains and Alternative Solutions, 21 STAN. J. INTL LAW 499, 499-507 (1985) and sources cited
therein. The post-LDC debt overload crisis assessment is more realistic and emphasizes previous overconfidence. See,
e.g., B. COHEN, IN WHOSE INrms? 18-55, 204-35 (1986); R. DALE, supra note 1, at 75-87; D. DELAhAIDE, DEBr
SHOCK 232-51 (1984); Y. PARK & J. ZWICK, lfM'NArTONA. BANKING IN THuozy AND PRAcncE 109-38 (1985).
5. The default insolvency potential of major U.S. multinational banks was quickly appreciated during the fall of
1982. See D. DELAMAIDE, supra note 4, at 232-34; J. MAKIN, THE GLOBAL DEBT Csts 217-23 (1984). By the fall of 1988,
the LDC debt overload problems of leading U.S. multinational banks had eased some, but were still serious. See, e.g.,
Big Banks Shift From Third World, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1988, at D-1, col. 3. As of June 30, 1988, the outstanding LDC
loan portfolios of major U.S. banks were:
LDC Loans As % of Equity
Citicorp $9.5b. N.A.
Bank of America 7. lb. 200
Manufacturers Hanover 7.1 b. 244
Chase Manhattan 6.4b. 148
Chemical Banking 4.5b. 143
J.P. Morgan 3.6b. 70
Bankers Trust 3.0b. 94
First Chicago 1.4b. 71
Wells Fargo 0.9b. 36
First Interstate 0.8b. 33
Security Pacific 0.8b. 21
$45.0b. 101 (13 bank composite)*
* (Includes Bank of Boston and Republic New York with only $0.4b. and $0.3b. respectively, of LDC loans). Id.
(statistics from Salomon Brothers).
6. For a good summary of recent major bank failures and bailouts, see I. SpRAcus, supra note 1, at 109-228.
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capital market and the competitiveness of U.S. multinational banks in the world
market required full protection for depositors and large banks. A similar $4 billion
FDIC bailout was extended in July 1988 to First Republic Bank, the largest Texas
bank, with $27 billion in assets. 7 While a great many smaller banks have been
allowed to fail in the 1980s, with widespread distress in agricultural and oil-patch
banking and thrift failures, most larger deposits in fact have been fully protected. 8
Certainly a double standard seems evident in Reagan-era bank regulatory policy,
which arguably encourages larger depositors to switch funding into bigger banks that
are considered too big to fail. This policy deserves more concern and criticism. But
the overall need to prevent most of the banking system from collapse, disruption, or
failure still is widely accepted by Congress and the public. In fact, no presidential
administration would be re-elected if extensive or large scale failures of banks or
financial institutions were allowed to jeopardize the country's liquidity or interna-
tional credit-worthiness. This political imperative underlies the need for continued
bank supervision and adequate capitalization for financial institutions. 9
Although some deregulation enthusiasts urged that bank supervision and
capitalization be relaxed substantially in the early 1980s-or even that government
deposit insurance be eliminated-this mood is passing.' 0 As Reagan-era bank
7. See Schwartz, Gibney & Thomas, Marrying for Money, NEwsWEEK, Aug. 8, 1988, at 48; Hayes, Talking
Deals-FDIC's Savvy on Bank's Taxes, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1988, at D-2, col. 1.
8. See W. Lovinr, BArnarso, supra note 1, at 55-56, 122-28; I. SPtRUE, supra note 1, at 242-64; see generally
Congress Will Provide Full Faith and Credit Backing for FSLIC Notes, FHLBB's Wall Says, [July-Dec.] Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 51, at 307 (Aug. 22, 1988) [hereinafter Congress Will Provide]; FDIC Has Become Insurer of the Banking
System, Not Just Deposits, Seidman Says, [July-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 252 (Aug. 15, 1988) [hereinafter
FDIC Has Become]; Financial Condition of Commercial Banks Steadily Declines Since 1981, GAO Says, [July-Dec.]
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 168 (Aug. 1, 1988) [hereinafter Financial Condition]; Senate Adopts Resolution Pledging
Full Faith and Credit for FSLIC Notes, [July-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 204 (Aug. 8, 1988) [hereinafter
Senate Adopts Resolution]; Bock, Homik & Svoboda, Bleak Year for the Banks, Te, Dec. 28, 1987, at 60; Caliguire
& Thomson, FDIC Policies for Dealing with Failed and Troubled Institutions, EcoN. Co.MMENTARY (Fed. Reserve Bank
of Cleveland), Oct. 1, 1987, at 1; Gorman, Hornik & Woodbury, Cracks in the System, TiNtE, Aug. 29, 1988, at 54;
Brumbaugh & Litan, The Banks are in Big Trouble, Too, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1988, § 3, at 3, col. I.
9. See W. LovErr, BAxmUGN, supra note 1, at 55-56, 122-28; I. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 242-64; see also
Congress Will Provide, supra note 8, at 307; FDIC Has Become, supra note 8, at 252; Senate Adopts Resolution, supra
note 8, at 204; Bock, Hornik & Svoboda, supra note 8, at 60; Caliguire & Thomson, supra note 8, at I; Gorman, Hornik
& Woodbury, supra note 8, at 54; Brumbaugh & Litan, supra note 8, § 3, at 3, col. 1. Caliguire and Thomson concluded
that: "The trend in bank failure resolution policies has reached a point of 100 percent de facto insurance for all depositors
and most creditors, and at least some protection for stockholders." Caliguire & Thomson, supra note 8, at 6. But many
commentators would agree with Sprague that this absolute, and perhaps excessive protection with respect to shareholders,
applied only to the large banks. I. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 242-43, 259. Uninsured depositors (those whose deposits
exceed $100,000) could occasionally take losses in smaller banks, thus encouraging the placement of bigger deposits in
larger banks that are considered too big to fail. These differences in treatment for different sized banks left most experts
with uncomfortable feelings. See, e.g., G. BENSTON, supra note 1, at 89-90. Sprague's solution would be to equalize the
burdens and risk with virtually 100% deposit insurance (by FDIC assessments on all deposits, foreign and domestic), and
place the primary costs of failure upon stockholders and management. I. SRAGUE, supra note 1, at 262-64. For a
discussion of systemic failure risks, see infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
10. For some banking and financial scholars, the idea of increasing market opportunities and pricing discipline
always appealed, but most of them understood the modem political and macroeconomic constraints and realities. First,
the public and politicians expect safe, sound banking with virtually 100% deposit insurance. Second, the public,
politicians, most economists, and the business establishment want a safe, sound liquidity and payments system with no
significant risks of financial panic, widespread bank failures, or another Great Depression. This leaves only limited room
to maneuver for. (i) increased latitude for bank growth, diversification, and competition; (ii) more interest rate freedom;
(iii) stronger supervision to limit undue risk taking; or (iv) more market discipline in deposit insurance or risk-based capital
requirements. A few took extreme positions on deregulation, e.g., eliminate the FDIC and trust financial markets
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regulators became more experienced at this work, the third-world debt overload crisis
grew more serious, and more U.S. banks and thrifts became troubled institutions, the
need for continuing supervision and adequate capital was better appreciated and far
more widely understood.
Between 1983 and 1987, federal bank regulators gradually strengthened capital
requirements quite substantially, and in 1987 and 1988, the G-12 countries
established common guidelines for risk-based bank capital requirements.I This Basle
to allow banks to operate freely again, with some Federal Reserve supervision and lender-of-last-resort support. But most
experts agreed that such drastic change was impractical politically and probably undesirable economically.
What emerged in the 1970s were mainly academic studies, including a report by the Hunt Commission, which was
appointed by President Nixon in 1971, suggesting more competition among financial institutions and a few proposals for
more market discipline with deposit insurance. See, e.g., C. HEN1nN, supra note 1, at 213-20; see generally Scott &
Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals for Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REv. 857,
886-901 (1971). Limited deregulation and deposit lending rivalry occurred in the later 1970s, along with somewhat more
interest rate rivalry, including NOW accounts. But inflation, higher interest rates, and Money Market Mutual Funds
finally forced an end to Regulation Q interest rate ceilings. This allowed more competition among banks and thrifts, and
ended regulatory ceilings for deposit interest rates. The Depository Institutions and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the
Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 were key milestones. See W. LovEr, BANKImG, supra note 1, at 153-78.
During the Reagan administration (1981-88), controversies developed over further deregulation, market disciplines,
risk-related deposit insurance, and capital requirements. See generally G. BENSroN, supra note 1, at 258-89; C. GoL.,ME
& D. HOLLAND, supra note 1, at 278-79; C. HENNINo, supra note 1, at 530-35; D. KmwEL. & R. PETERsoN, supra note
1, at 237-38; W. Lov-r, BANDING, supra note 1, at 122-28; M. MAt.LoY, I THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS § 1.4 (1988);
T. MAYER, supra note 1, at 394-99; I. SPRAOUE, supra note 1, at 261. For additional highlights on problems of
risk-discipline for banks and financial institutions, see G. BENSTON, supra note 1, at 227-43; N. LASH, supra note 1, at
102-25; see generally E. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS n FEDERAL DEPosrr IINSt ANCE 12-24, 112-17, 158-60 (1985);
Baer, Private Prices, Public Insurance: The Pricing of Federal Deposit Insurance, EcoN. PEisp. (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Chicago), Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 56; Baer & Brewer, Uninsured Deposits as a Source of Market Discipline: Some New
Evidence, ECON. PERsp. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago), Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 23; Cobos, Cooke, Mitchell, Sexton &
Silverberg, Market Discipline and the Federal Deposit Insurance System, in DEPosrr INSURANCE IN A CHANG=nG
ENvIRONMENT II1-1 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ed. 1983); Cooke, Risk-Related Insurance Premiums, in
DEPosrr INSURANCE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 11-1 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ed. 1983); Insuring
Confidence-Deposit Insurance Reform, 5 ANN. REv. BANtKNG LAW 111 (1986); Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in
the Emerging Financial Services Industry, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 195 (1984); Kareken, Deposit Insurance Reform or
Deregulation is the Cart, Not the Horse, Q. REv. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis), Spring 1983, at 1; Kaufman, The
Federal Safety Net: Not for Banks Only, ECON. PIMtP. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago), Nov.-Dee. 1987, at 25-27;
Keeton, Deposit Insurance and the Deregulation of Deposit Rates, ECON. Rev. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City), Apr.
1984, at 28; Comment, The "Brokered Deposit" Regulation: A Response to the FDIC's and FHLBB's Efforts to Limit
Deposit Insurance, 33 UCLA L. REV. 594 (1985). But cf. R. BRUMBAUGH, THuITS UNDER SIEGE 113-28 (1988); Congress
Should Concentrate on Deposit Insurance Reform, FHLBB Lawiyer Tells ABA, [July-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 51,
at 266 (Aug. 15, 1988) [hereinafter Congress Should Concentrate]; National Council Rejects Quick-Fix Approach to
Deposit Insurance Reform, Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 409 (Mar. 11, 1985) [hereinafter National Council].
Between July 1982 and July 1983 (from the Penn Square failure through the bailout of Continental Illinois), federal
bank regulations allowed substantial losses for some large depositors, who were uninsured over the $100,000 limit as a
means of strengthening market discipline. But when a really big bank, the seventh largest in the U.S., threatened to
collapse, with large foreign and U.S. business deposits that were mostly uninsured, the shock to American capital markets
and confidence in U.S. banking was felt to be too great. Since then, federal regulators have bailed out most larger
institutions, or at least prevented the larger, uninsured depositors from suffering significant losses. This has weakened
market discipline again and forced bank regulators to adhere to a more traditional and balanced blend of strong depositor
protection, strengthened capital adequacy (including subordinated debt assuming capital risks), increased deposit
insurance funds, improved supervision, increased disclosure, recommendations for including foreign deposits in the
insurance-premium base, and limited variations in insurance premium charges to reflect risk. Since 1987-88, risk-based
capital requirements have been implemented. See, e.g., Healey, Recommendations for Change, 5 ANN. REV. OF BANmIN
L. 133 (1986) (summary of recommended changes in deposit insurance by the Treasury Department's Cabinet Council on
Economic Affairs, January 1985, which clearly illustrates this return to a more balanced blend of bank supervision and
prudential safeguards).
11. Final International Risk-Based Capital Standards Adopted by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations,
[July-Dee.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 143 (July 25, 1988) [hereinafter Basle Risk-Based Capital Standards]; see,
e.g., Basle Committee Issues Final Risk-Based Capital Standards, [July-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 5 1, at 135 (July
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compromise agreement between G-12 central banks and finance ministries is a major
breakthrough toward a more level playing field for international banking. It also helps
to ameliorate some of the more "painful" potential in emerging U.S. bank capital
requirements. Fortunately, most healthy U.S. banks are already in compliance with
these requirements. Only a few of the largest U.S. banks that were undercapitalized
and afflicted with excessive LDC loans in their asset portfolios during the early 1980s
are slightly pinched by the new G-12 requirements. When properly understood, even
their difficulties are not too serious during the transition period of implementation
between 1988 and 1992.12
Now, the more interesting question is how to handle capital requirements for
bank holding companies as they venture into more securities distribution activities.
Recently, many of the largest U.S. banks and bank holding companies have been
pressing hard for greater securities powers. 13 Between 1983 and 1986, many large
25, 1988) [hereinafter Basle Committee]; Central Bankers Approve Risk-Related Capital Standards to Govern 12
Countries, [July-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 101 (July 18, 1988) [hereinafter Central Bankers]; FedMay Let
BHCs Diverge from New Risk Capital Rules on Certain Preferred Stock, [July-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 79
(July 18, 1988) [hereinafter Fed May Let]; Malloy, U.S. International Banking and the New Capital Adequacy
Requirements: New, Old and Unexpected, 7 ANN. Ray. BAN.KINo L. 75 (1988); see also Fed Adopts Risk-Based Capital
Concept, Agrees to Leeway for Bank Holding Cos., [July-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 201 (Aug. 8, 1988)
[hereinafter Fed Adopts Risk-Based]; Fed Staff Summary and Recommendations on Risk-Based Capital Plan, [July-Dec.]
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 232 (Aug. 8, 1988) (adopted by the Federal Reserve Board) [hereinafter Fed Staff
Summary]; see generally Bardos, The Risk-Based Capital Agreement: A Further Step Towards Policy Convergence, Q.
REv. (Fed. Reserve Bank of New York), Winter 1987-88, at 26; Keeley, Bank Capital Regulation in the Early 1980's,
FRBSF WEEKLY Lm'm (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco), Jan. 22, 1988, at 1.
12. Most of the "pinching" involves the largest U.S. multinational banks and comes from their lower
capitalization in the early 1980s and substantial losses on LDC loans. See, e.g., W. Lov-r, BANrmo, supra note 1, at
119-21; Forde, Citicorp Puts Competitors on the Spot, Am. Banker, Aug. 20, 1987, at 2, col. 2. In 1987, the top ten
U.S. bank holding companies took nearly S10 billion in losses on Third World loans and reduced their shareholder equity
(traditional common stock) capital by almost $10 billion during the second quarter of 1987, i.e., from $37,468 million
to $27,521 million. Id. See also App. Table I and 11.
But the Basle G-12 guidelines, as implemented by the Federal Reserve, allow enough leeway for preferred stock
issues, subordinated debt, and provisional loan loss reserves so that even the large U.S. multinational banks can mobilize
ample noncommon stock capital through 1992 and beyond. The lower risk weights for many assets provide for the easing
of bank burdens. See infra notes 58-66 and 69-70 and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, some bank and financial commentators have grumbled about unfavorable consequences associated with
adoption of the new capital standards. See, e.g., Blander, Ironing Out Those Troublesome Bumps, TuE BANKER, Feb.
1988, at 56; Humphrey & Humphrey, How Risk-Based Capital Will Affect Operations, THE BANKEs MAo., Mar.-Apr.
1988, at 22; Byron, Capital Guidelines Could Weaken Banks, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1987, at 32, col. 3; Cates, Self-Review
IsAnswer to Unrealistic Capital Policy, Am. Banker, Apr. 16, 1987, at 4, col. 1; Horvitz, More is Better asfar as Capital
Requirements Go, Am. Banker, Apr. 24, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
Much of the grumbling about the adverse consequences reflects a desire for the highest possible capital leverage or
gearing ratio and the greatest profit potential, regardless of the risks imposed upon depositors, the economy, and society
at large. For a more balanced view, see Howcroft, UK Bank Capital Adequacy and the Convergent Proposals, 2 J. INT'L
BAntso L. 203 (1987). The most naive critics scem to believe that private "market analysts" could replace banking
supervision, government deposit insurance, prudential regulation, and central bank support. Their basic blunder is to
assume that outsiders-depositors, analysts, and the market-can easily supervise banks and their asset portfolios. This
is simply nonsense! In fact, this activity requires substantial skill and knowledge, not readily developed by outsiders.
Centuries of business history before 1933, and ample financial experience since the U.S. strengthened bank
deposit-insurance and regulation demonstrate that safe, sound, responsible banking does not happen magically all by
itself.
But, of course, no one should believe that risk-based capital requirements, or any other constraint, could operate as
the sole guarantor of responsible banking. The point is, rather, that supervision and prudential requirements need blending
together. In this regard, see Taggart & Greenbaum, Bank Capital andPublic Regulation, 10 J. MONEY, CREorr & BANMo
158 (1978).
13. See generally Reform of the Nation's Banking and Financial Systems: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
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banks lobbied strongly for the Garn Bill that would have allowed interstate financial
conglomerates. Although this federal drive for broader powers largely failed in
Congress, bigger banks were winning a fight for more interstate banking authority in
many state legislatures. Then during 1987 and 1988, the Federal Reserve, with
Supreme Court approval, broadened bank holding company securities powers
through wider regulatory interpretations. During spring 1988, the Proxmire Bill
passed the U.S. Senate to allow much broader securities powers for bank holding
companies, although with greater supervision and "firewalls" between banking and
securities. While there was tougher opposition in the U.S. House of Representatives
to weakening the Glass-Steagall wall and permitting greatly enlarged bank securities
powers, it seems likely that broader securities powers for banks and bank holding
companies, along with strengthened firewalls would develop in the later 1980s or
early 1990s. 14 (The extent to which "full-service financial conglomerates" might be
allowed is more doubtful (e.g., the extent to which bank incursions into the insurance
industry would be permissible).15 Further, the potential for commercial and
Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist and 2d Sess. (1987-88) (parts I-IV) [hereinafter Reform Hearings]; W. LovErr, BANrmcr:, supra
note 1, at 434-56; DERE.utLATmI FtrCANcA.L SERvtcas (G. Kaufman & R. Kormendi eds. 1986) (especially Final Report
and Recommendations at 191-201); Direction of the Financial Services Industry, 18 LOYOLA L.A.L. REv. 965-1193
(1985); Financial Restructuring, CHrAENGE, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 4-43. These materials reflect almost all the divergent
views and conflicting interests on financial markets and possible restructuring. For established boundaries, see M.
MALLOY, 2 THE CorORATE LAW OF BANKS § 7 (1988 & Supp. 1988). See also 38 BANK EXPANSION Q. 21-24, and 56-57
(1st Quarter 1988).
14. For recent legislative developments, see Cranford, Weary House Panel OKs Bank-Deregulation Bill, Cong. Q.
Weekly Rep. (CQI) at 2096 (July 30, 1988); Dingell Promises Energy and Commerce Won't Obstruct Action on Banking
Bill, [July-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 251 (Aug. 15, 1988) [hereinafter Dingell Promises]; Report on Banking
Reform Bill Reflects Ongoing Divisions on Banking Committee, [July-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 257 (Aug.
15, 1988) [hereinafter Ongoing Divisions]. But see Rapp, Bill on New Bank Powers Dies, Taking Thrift Commission With
It, Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. (CQI) at 3064 (Oct. 22, 1988). On the issue of "firewalls," discussed frequently in Reform
Hearings, supra note 13, see R. LrrAN, WHAT StioULD BANKS Do? 145-48 (1987); Litan, Evaluating and Controlling the
Risks of Financial Products Deregulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 41-42 (1985); Sprague, American Megabanks: Scary,
Not Scarce, Wall St. J., July 15, 1987, at 28, col. 3.
15. For introductions to insurance and pension regulation, see, e.g., W. LovTrr, BANrrco, supra note 1, at 338-79,
422-56. For discussion of the problems of commingling the banking and insurance industry, see, e.g., Reform Hearings,
supra note 13, part 3, at 1-86 (testimony of William V. Irons, William A. Lovett, and Warren Wise). For further
information on insurance and pension regulation, see also K. BLAcK & H. SKrPPER, Ls'E INsuRtAcE 568-90 (11th ed.
1987); M. DoRAAN, ltrmoDUCnoN To INstANcE 410-30 (3d ed. 1987); A. MuNNEL.L, Tr EcoNosocs OF PRVATE
PENSIONS 130-49 (1982); G. REMA, Pri'ci'LaS OF INsuRANcE 581-99 (2d ed. 1986); A. TOBIAS, THE INVIsIBLE BArNsRS
246-76 (1982). Insurance industry opposition to allowing banks into their markets is widespread, especially from the
250,000-strong network of independent insurance agencies, together with the large "direct writer" big company sales
forces. These marketing establishments feel greatly threatened by banks selling insurance policies. Their spokesmen fear
unfair competition and the dangers of tying bank loans, credit, and deposit accounts to insurance policies. At the
underwriting or insurance company level, for example, the level concerned with the maintenance of adequate reserves,
administration, and investment programs, there also exists extensive opposition to commingling the banking and insurance
industries. After the Dodd Amendment victory in 1984, when a large majority of the U.S. Senate refused to allow bank
holding companies into most insurance markets, the bank diversification lobby has concentrated mainly on securities
powers, with insurance powers a longer term objective.
Public interest questions are very important. Would the integrity of insurance industry reserves, investments, and
reliability be threatened if a stampede of merger activity, takeovers, and scrambled financial service conglomerates were
allowed? To what extent would financial concentration, already higher in securities and insurance than in banking, be
increased? How would competition suffer in the long run from substantial increases in concentration and increasing
difficulty for new entrants to compete against giant financial conglomerates? What would happen to customer service and
reliability, pricing, and fees? Are there any significant scale economies in the formation of giant financial conglomerates?
See, e.g., Reform Hearings, supra note 13, part 3, at 210 (testimony of William A. Lovett). For further information on
scale economies in banking, see, e.g., Shepherd & Heggestad, The Banking Industry, in Tia STReucruR OF AtmucAN
INDUSTRY 290, 304-15 (W. Adams 7th ed. 1986) (introduction to the literature); see also Benston, Hanweck & Humphrey,
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industrial conglomerates to merge with banks and bank holding companies is quite up
in the air.)16
This left important ambiguities and problems for Congress and bank regulators.
If strengthened risk-based capital requirements are the evolving solution to moral
hazard problems in financial institutions, along with renewed supervision discipline
and reasonable accountability, how should securities underwriting and marketing
activities by banks, bank holding companies, and financial service conglomerates be
risk-rated? What capital requirements are appropriate for securities firms, and how,
if at all, should capital requirements be meshed between bank-securities operations?
A more complex, troublesome question is how, if at all, capital requirements should
be defined, enforced, and maintained for financial-general business conglomerates (if
these are to be allowed into ownership of bank holding companies or financial service
holding companies)? Modem experience with bank supervision, safety, and sound-
ness has demonstrated extensively that conglomerate business misfortunes and severe
losses are very hard to keep separate from a bank controlled by the same interests.
Almost inevitably, a failing or troubled conglomerate uses its bank, lending
authority, or loan guarantees to prop up or keep the general business afloat for at least
a little while longer. This substantial and continuing danger, in fact, is one of the
major reasons why modern banking laws tried to keep banking and fiduciary
Scale Economies in Banking, 14 J. MoNEY, CREnrr & BANKING 435 (1982); McCall, Economies of Scale, Operating
Efficiencies and the Organizational Structure of Commercial Banks, I I J. BANK Ran. 95 (1980).
Recently, some bankers contend that potential economies from diversification might exceed previously experienced
scale economies. One reason is a claim that capital reserves can be reduced for very large institutions, i.e., that higher
levels of leveraging should be permitted for the largest banks or financial holding companies and not allowed for smaller
institutions. But the risk of default on loans or investments by the larger institutions is still similar and big financial
bureaucracies are just as capable of errors in judgment. There have been major difficulties since 1982 for the largest U.S.
multinational banks with regard to excessive loans to Latin American and developing country borrowers. This insecure
lending substantially exceeded the capital resources of the ten largest U.S. banks. For political and economic reasons, of
course, the largest banks were not allowed to fail. See, e.g., I. SRAOUE, supra note I, at 149-228 (description of
Continental Illinois receivership). But a policy of not allowing the largest institutions to fail is hardly proof of efficiency;
it merely reflects favoritism and direct subsidies in regulation, and somewhat weakens the normal moral hazard for failure
and bad management.
A more limited possibility is operating economies achieved through adding products or services that are delivered by
existing institutions such as banks, thrifts, securities firms, mutual funds, insurance companies and agencies, and pension
organizations. Efficiency gains are feasible in this direction. But many of these gains for winning institutions will be losses
for other institutions. While many jobs and profits may be reshuffled, lost, and won through financial "turf wars," the
real gains to the public may be speculative and are likely to be overstated.
16. Many banking experts oppose the integration of deposit-insured banking with nonfinancial conglomerates
involving industry and marketing at this stage. See, e.g., W. LovEr, BANKING, supra note I, at 434-56; Corrigan, Keep
Banking Apart, CALErNGE, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 28; Dingell Promises, supra note 14, at 251; Final Report and
Recommendations, in D otnnGTo FiNANciAL SERVicEs 191 (G. Kaufman & R. Kormendi eds. 1986); Litan, supra note
14, at 19-34; Litan, Which Way for Congress?, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 36; Lovett, Federalism, Boundary
Conflicts andResponsible FinancialRegulation, 18 LOYoLA L.A.L. REv. 1053 (1985); Ongoing Divisions, supra note 14,
at 257; Rhoades, Interstate Banking and Product Line Expansion: Implications from Available Evidence, 18 LoYoLA
L.A.L. REv. 1115 (1985); Tobin, A Case for Preserving Regulatory Distinctions, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 10;
Sprague, supra note 14, at 28, col. 3. But a few leading insurance companies, including Allstate, Sears Roebuck, Dean
Witter, and Coldwell Banker already cross these boundaries. If we allow banks to be scrambled generally into securities
firms and then into insurance and pension fund operations, will it be feasible to prevent conglomerates generally from
owning financial service holding companies? Can effective firewalls be maintained and safeguarded between financial and
nonfinancial activities?
For a classic case history on the difficulty of insulating a bank from its conglomerate owner's problems, see J. W'rrE,
TEACHING MATERiALs ot BANiNG LAw 833-47 (1976) (United States National Bank and Franklin National Bank).
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activities separate from, and uncontaminated by, general conglomerate and more
risky business enterprises.' 7
Perhaps bank capital owners want to make some bolder, more diversified
investments. Fine, let them do so! But the broader avenue for investment diversifi-
cation under modern banking law in the U.S. has been through separate investments,
independently selected by individual bank shareholders and owners. It has been
considered unsound since the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 for commercial banks and
bank holding companies-fiduciary institutions holding themselves out as safe and
sound depository institutions to the general public, with their deposits government-
insured by the FDIC and FSLIC (Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation),
and more generally "supported" against failure by the Federal Reserve-to make
speculative investments with depositor funds. This has meant that banks are
"special," more carefully regulated, and properly insured by government for the
general benefit of financial stability and prosperity. How can this closely supervised,
government-insured banking business, with stronger risk-based capital requirements,
be loosely integrated into general commerce? Further, if we allow more integration
and diversification into securities investment and marketing, what kind of "fire-
walls," accountability, and extended risk-based capital requirements are
appropriate?' 8
11. MACROECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC RESPONSIBILmES OF BANKING
Banking and depository institutions provide important services to their commu-
nities and the public-at-large. Liquid assets, including specie and currency owned by
individuals, private business, and corporate enterprise are more efficiently safe-
guarded and profitably reinvested by specialized institutions such as commercial
banks, savings banks, savings and loans, and credit unions. Banking institutions
traditionally reloan liquid deposits from the public to business, farmers, home and
other property buyers, working families, and consumer households. So long as good
collateral or security assures that the loan principal and interest can be repaid to
banking institutions, their balance sheets remain solvent. A small default rate is
acceptable with adequate loan loss reserves. With enough "cash" (specie, currency,
Federal Reserve deposits, or correspondent bank accounts) and sufficient marketable
securities (government bonds and high-grade corporate bonds) in the asset portfolio,
a bank's solvency in the liquidity sense is secured. This allows banks to invest the
majority of their assets more profitably in general loans, trade finance, or risk
guarantees somewhat more aggressively but without undue risk. Highly speculative
17. See, e.g., Corrigan, supra note 16, at 28; Sprague, supra note 14, at 28.
18. To the extent boundaries are allowed to erode between banking and securities activities, and perhaps, between
these fields and insurance, pension funds, and other industries, the central questions for responsible supervision policy
will become accountability, capital requirements, permissible leverage, and the flow of funds and potential liabilities
between these activities. Resolving these issues will define the playing field for competition and establish the margins for
profit and survival among financial intermediaries. Thus, "firewalls," safeguards against bank holding company
vulnerability and the protection of deposit insurance funds, become crucial issues. See Reform Hearings, supra note 13,
part 3, at 42-86 (testimony of William A. Lovett); R. LrrAN, supra note 14, at 144-89; Corrigan, supra note 16, at 28;
Litan, supra note 14, at 41-42.
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investments with great uncertainty or downside risk, however, are not considered
appropriate for banking institutions because banks must stand ready to redeem
customer deposits.1 9
The privilege of fractional reserve banking, with limited liability bank corpo-
rations or holding companies, allows highly leveraged profit-making for bank leaders
and stockholders. Yet this multiplies the supply of "bank money," commercial, and
other credits from banking institutions to society, which thereby encourages industrial
activity, trade, and general prosperity, provided that liquidity and credit expansion is
not carried to inflationary or speculative excess. Modern central banks, like the
Federal Reserve, regulate aggregate monetary growth and credit availability for this
reason.
20
To prevent undue profit in banking we allow considerable competition and
relatively free entry (under chartering and supervisory safeguards). This narrows the
range for the bank profitability and fosters rivalry and innovation to improve banking
services. On the other hand, completely unrestricted entry, over-banking, and
cutthroat competition weakens bank earnings and frequently leads to speculative or
imprudent lending.21 This would conflict with the goals of reasonable stability and
reliability for banking. Accordingly, chartering procedures and bank supervision try
to ensure adequate capitalization, responsible management, and reasonable
performance. 22 Losses should be minimized and bank regulators should impose
corrective measures or change leadership before a bank's capital is wasted on bad or
loss loans accounts. 23 In this way, the potential liability to the government's deposit
insurance agencies (such as the FDIC, FSLIC, and NCUSIF (National Credit Union
Share Insurance Fund)) may be minimized and premium costs for deposit insurance
held to low levels.
Modem bank regulation, lender-of-last-resort support, and government deposit
insurance evolved through a series of financial panics and depressions, culminating
in the worldwide depression of the 1930s. Most industrial nations found themselves
suffering heavy unemployment, reduced prosperity, and painful social conflicts.
From this learning experience came improved macroeconomic thinking, and the
practice of modern central banks and treasury ministries to keep aggregate spending
and liquidity growing within moderate, sustainable levels. The Great Depression
taught that purchasing power, liquidity, and aggregate demand should be sustained by
19. See J. GALBRAr'H, supra note 1, at 173-84; C. GOLazMtBE & D. HOLLAND, supra note 1, at 69-76; C. HENNiNo,
supra note 1, at 487-96; D. KIDwaL & R. PTaEmsoN, supra note 1, at 89-97; N. LASH, supra note 1, at 23; W. Lovrr,
BAtNmr, supra note 1, at 118-28; T. MAYER, supra note 1, at 19-24.
20. See J. GALBRATH, supra note 1, at 125-27; C. HENING, supra note 1, at 172-77; D. KmwEL & R. PERSoN,
supra note 1, at 131-51; N. LASH, supra note 1, at 78-84; W. LovErr, BA.tmG, supra note 1, at 55-90; T. MAYFa, supra
note 1, at 174-80, 327-29; see also W. GuamEa, SEcRETS oF Ta TataLE 355-60 (1987); S. HYmAN, supra note 1, at
326-30; D. KErnL, LEADESHIP AT THE FED 4-5, 175-76 (1985); W. MELTON, INSIDE Ta FED 43-57 (1985).
21. See C. Gomm tBa& D. HoL.AND, supra note 1, at 93-107, 131-89; W. Lovrr, BANKINGo, supra note 1, at 110-44,
451-56; M. MALLoY, supra note 13, at §§ 8-9.
22. See C. GOM.aBE & D, HOLAND, supra note 1, at 93-107, 269-81; W. Lovurr, BA NG, supra note 1, at
113-21; M. MALLOY, supra note 1, at § 2; M. MALLOY, supra note 13, at § 10.
23. See G. BENSTON, supra note 1, at 91-108, 245-72; I. SPRAGuE, supra note 1, at 232-34; see also C. Gotn~mB-
& D. HOLLAND supra note 1, at 69-76.
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government deficits, if necessary, to prevent excessive slumps or unemployment. 24
Governments also fashion tax policies and other inducements to encourage industrial
expansion and broader prosperity. 25 Employment and manpower training policies
may help jobs and opportunities grow with the economy. 26 During the 1950s and
1960s, most OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development)
countries achieved stronger economic growth and relatively low unemployment with
only modest inflation.27 But in the 1970s, inflation grew more serious, often with
excessive government deficits, a wage-price spiral, scarcities in commodity markets,
and yet unemployment tended to increase. "Stagflation" afflicted many OECD
nations, with greater inflation and unemployment, and declining productivity in some
sectors. 28 Finally, in the 1980s, restricted monetary growth, higher interest rates, and
deflation slowed greatly the inflationary momentum of the 1970s. The wage-price
spiral declined, with more competition from low-wage new industrial countries,
forcing greater productivity discipline. Somewhat higher unemployment, compared
to the 1950s and 1960s, also combined with weaker unions to reduce "wage"
inflation in many industrial nations. 29
Other developments picking up momentum in the 1980s were greater interna-
tional movements of capital, investment, and liquidity. A more open, global, and
diversified marketplace brought many opportunities for trade and export/import
24. See J. GALBRAITH, supra note 1, at 214-15, 286-92, 305-11; C. GOLEMBE & D. HOLLAND, supra note 1, at
8-9; W. GREDER, supra note 20, at 420-25; C. HENNING, supra note 1, at 517-52; D. KErn., supra note 20, at 109-12,
173-79; D. KIDWELL & R. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 538-42; N. LASH, supra note 1, at 11-21; W. LovErr, BANKING, supra
note 1, at 51-61; T. MAYER, supra note 1, at 301-20, 374-99; W. MELTON, supra note 20, at 138-49; see generally R.
DALE, supra note 1; S. HYMAN, supra note 1; P. STDoSrtSt & H. KROOs, supra note 1.
25. See A. ANDO, M. BLUME & I. FREND, Tim STRucrUtr AND REFORM OF Ta U.S. TAX SysT i 5-9 (1985); J.
MAXWELL & J. ARONSON, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL Gov RImEmts 10-30 (3d ed. 1977); J. PECIAM, FEDERAL TAX
PoLicY 5-7, 27-37 (5th ed. 1987).
26. Manpower training and pro-employment policies received greater emphasis and budgetary support in the later
1960s and the 1970s, and have been cut back, with more reliance on free markets, in the 1980s. But how to provide more
jobs and good wages was still a big issue in the 1988 presidential campaign. See, e.g., M. DUKIS & R. KANTER,
CREATINo a FTRE 54-82, 107-56 (1988) (emphasis placed upon government-business partnership). In contrast, most
Republicans favor more modest government effort in this area. See, e.g., The Kennedy-Quayle employee training
legislation enacted in 1982 known as the Job Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-1781 (west 1985). See also
Alter, Padgett, King & Noah, Who Is Dan Quayle?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29, 1988, at 22, 25.
27. See, e.g., A. BROWN, WORLD INFLATION SiNcE 1950, at 347-50 (1985); W. LovErr, INFLATION AND POLrtcs
11-27 (1982) [hereinafter W. Lovarr, IrLAION]; L. R YNOLDS, Ecoromuc GROWTH IN a THmD WORLD, 1850-1980, at
36-38 (1985); see generally S. LmBERMAN, THE GROWTH OF EUROPEAN MuD ECONO.sMs 1945-1970 (1977).
28. See, e.g., A. BROWN, supra note 27, at 362-64; W. LoVrT, INFLATION, supra note 27, at 25-27; L. REYOLDS,
supra note 27, at 36-38; see also R. FLANAGAN, D. SosKicE & L. ULMAN, UuOmSt, EcONOMIc STAntIzAznON, AND
INcoNMEs PoIciEs 5-36 (1983) [hereinafter R. FLANAGAN]; G. HABERLER, THE PR oBLEM OF STAGFLATION 71-74 (1985);
Denison, Accounting for Slower Economic Growth: An Update, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARisONs OF PRODUCTInvY AND
CAUSES OF THE SLOWDOWN 1, 29-34 (J. Kendrick ed. 1984); Maier, Inflation and Stagnation as Politics and History, in
THE PoLrnIcs OF INFLATION A D ECONOMUC STAGNATION 3, 14-18 (L. Lindberg & C. Maier eds. 1985); see generally S.
Liatim mN, supra note 27.
29. See A. BROWN, supra note 27, at 220-32; R. FLANAGAN, supra note 28, at 5-36; G. HAEERI.ER, supra note 28,
at 71-74; W. LovTrr, INFLATION, supra note 27, at 73-85; Barry, Does Democracy Cause Inflation? Political Ideas of
Some Economists, in THE PoLmcs OF INFLATION AND EcONOMIc STAGNATION, supra note 28, at 280, 297-307; Mills, U.S.
and European Approaches to Improving Productivity and the Quality of Work Life, in INTERNATIONAL CoMPARISoNS OF
PRODucrnvrY AND CAUSES OF THE SLOWDOWN, supra note 28, at 361. For the growing importance of world market
competition, often sponsored by foreign industrial policies and low wage rivalries, see W. Lovarr, WoRLD TRADE RtVALRY
53, 183-85, 212-17 (1987) [hereinafter W. Lovarr, TRADE]. For recent U.S. macroeconomic developments, see B.
BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE GREAT AMERICAN JOB MACHINE: THE PROLIFERATION OF LOw-VAGE E'PLOYmN IN Tm
U.S. ECONOMY 4, 38 (1986); W. Lovrr, BANItNO, supra note 1, at 73-85.
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expansion. But Japan, West Germany, Switzerland, and many New Industrial
Countries (NICs) benefitted more than other OECD nations (including Great Britain
and the U.S.). The most successful nations geared their economic policies, interest
rates, and exchange rates to promote stronger, long-term economic growth and export
expansion.30
Lately, awkward problems for the U.S. have been excessive government budget
deficits with higher U.S. interest rates and increased U.S. dependence on foreign
borrowing. Between 1982 and 1988, U.S. federal deficits exceeded $1,100 billion,
and approached $200 billion annually (nearly five percent of GNP) between 1983 and
1987. The U.S. switched from the largest creditor nation to the largest debtor nation.
While the U.S. got by with heavy foreign borrowing and capital inflows, U.S.
exports were weakened, imports surged, and a stubborn trade deficit followed. Since
early 1985, the U.S. dollar depreciated by almost fifty percent against strong foreign
currencies such as the Japanese yen, German deutschmark, and Swiss franc. A
substantial premium developed in U.S. interest rates over hard currency rates. This
increased costs for domestic American manufacturers and greatly complicated
rescheduling of Latin American debts, which heavily involved most leading U.S.
multinational banks.3'
Unfortunately, the prime source of excessive U.S. budget deficits is a serious,
unresolved conflict over spending priorities and tax loads that developed in the
Reagan era.3 2 President Reagan wanted substantially increased defense spending, a
thirty percent income tax cut, and major reductions in civilian spending other than
basic social security (Old Age Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance), which has
its own payroll tax revenues. Congress accepted most of the defense increases and tax
cuts, but was unable to cut civilian spending enough to offset a major widening of the
federal deficit. Reagan sought further civilian spending cuts by seeking a line-item
veto authority to make cuts without Congressional agreement, but Congress refused
to delegate its spending power to the President. Mondale, the Democratic candidate,
wanted to raise taxes in 1984, but Reagan counterattacked by saying he would accept
30. See W. LovErr, TRADE, supra note 29, at 8-14; see also Packard, The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis, 66 FOREIGN
Aus. 348, 351-53 (1987); Van Wolferen, The Japan Problem, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 288, 291-95 (1986). For additional
insights into the superior economic performance of Japan, West Germany, and Switzerland, see W. Lov rT, INFLATION,
supra note 27, at 147-68.
31. See J. FAUX, GErTING RID OF THE TRADE DFcr: A CHEAPER DOLLAR Is NOT ENOUGH 1 (1988); INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, RESOLVING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: AFTER NVALL STREET 1 (1987); W. LovErTr,
INTLATION, supra note 27, at 147-68; W. Lov-r, TRADE, supra note 29, at 190; S. MARmS, DEICrrS AND THE DOLLAR:
THE ,VoRL ECONOMY ATRISK 105-27 (1987); Bergsten, Economic Imbalances and World Politics, 65 FOREION Ap:. 770,
774 (1987); Cumby & Levich, Definitions and Magnitudes, in CAPITAL FLIGHT AND THIRD WORLD DEBT 27 (D. Lessard
& J. Williamson eds. 1987); Reich, The Economics of Illusion and the Illusion of Economics, 66 FOREIGN Asp. 516,
523-24 (1988); Silk, The U.S. and the World Economy, 65 FOREIGN App. 458,462 (1987); Van Volferen, supra note 30,
at 298-99.
32. INs-mtE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 31, at 1; W. LovEr, INFLATION, supra note 27, at
195-207; S. MARzis, supra note 31, at 35; Bergsten, supra note 31, at 770; Rapp, Deficit Limits Reagan's Options in
1989 Budget, Cong. Q. weekly Rep. (CQI) at 327 (Feb. 20, 1988) [hereinafter Rapp, Deficit Limits]; Rapp, House Panel
Turns Creative to Craft Fiscal 1989 Measure, Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. (CQ1) at 726 (Mar. 19, 1988) [hereinafter Rapp,
House Panel]; Rapp, OMB Fiscal"89 Budget Report Puts Hill Democrats in a Bind, Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. (CQI) at 2089
(1988) [hereinafter Rapp, OMB Fiscal]; Reich, supra note 31, at 516; Silk, supra note 31, at 459-60; Volcker, Facing
Up to the Twin Deficits, CHALLENGE, Special Anniversary Issue 1987, at 31; Walsh, Do Deficits Really Matter?, FRBSF
XWEEu.K Lnr (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco), Jan. 15, 1988, at 1.
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tax increases only as a last resort. When Reagan won a landslide election in
November 1984, this greatly discouraged any other presidential candidate from
offering to raise taxes. In this situation, the Gramm-Rudman compromise of 1985
was designed to phase in gradual spending reductions over five years. But the conflict
between Reagan and Congressional Democrats continued and implementation has
been weak. In 1988, the U.S. federal budget deficit was still somewhere between
$145 and 175 billion including emergency drought relief. Clearly, an excessive
budget deficit has been passed along to the next administration.
In this context, American banks and savings institutions suffered a great increase
in failure rates during the 1980s. 33 Between 1940 and 1980, only 568 insured banks
failed, with only $6.2 billion of insured deposits; this averaged only fourteen banks
yearly out of some 14,500 U.S. banks. This total held relatively constant, with
mergers offsetting new entrants. But between 1981 and 1987, 621 insured bank
failures occurred involving $65 billion in deposits. This represented a ten-fold
increase in annual failures and a seventy-fold annual increase in the value of deposits
involved. Fifteen hundred U.S. banks in 1988 were considered "problem banks,"
constituting roughly ten percent of the nation's total. In addition, U.S. savings and
loans suffered a severe squeeze in the late 1970s between rising interest deposit rates
and long-term fixed rate mortgage earnings. 34 By the early 1980s, eighty percent of
the Savings & Loans (S & Ls) were losing money and many had depleted capital and
reserves. Fortunately, lower interest rates in the mid to late 1980s allowed the
majority of thrift institutions to recover, with half of the thrifts converting from
mutual to stock institutions to raise more capital. Many S & Ls got into subsequent
difficulties, however, with speculative "A,D,C" lending (real estate acquisition,
development, and construction loans) encouraged by partial deregulation. Roughly
500 of the 3,000 surviving S & Ls were believed insolvent in the summer of 1988,
with losses exceeding current FSLIC reserves. The troubled thrift and banking crisis
was most aggravated in the oil-patch states of Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana where
a previous oil-gas price boom encouraged excessive real estate and commercial
development. Some $50-100 billion in losses may be suffered by financial institutions
in these states because oil-gas prices, exploration, and drilling declined so drastically
in the mid-1980s. Agricultural banks in much of the Midwest and parts of the West
also suffered from reduced commodity prices in most of the 1980s that hurt many
farmers and lowered land and collateral values. A large share of bank failures in the
1980s involved small agricultural banks, although these difficulties seemed to be
easing in 1988-unless the 1988 summer drought weakened farm incomes.
But why did U.S. banking failures increase so sharply in the 1980s, and what
33. See W. LovEr, BANKING, supra note 1, at 122-28; I. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 242-62; see generally
Congress Will Provide, supra note 8, at 307; Financial Condition, supra note 8, at 168; Bock, Hornik & Svoboda, supra
note 8, at 60; Caliguire & Thomson, supra note 8, at 1; Gorman, Hornik & Woodbury, supra note 8, at 54; Brumbaugh
& Litan, supra note 8, § 3, at 3, col. 1.
34. See R. BRUMBAUoH, supra note 10, at 31-56; W. LovErr, BANKING, supra note 1, at 76-82; I. SPRAGUE, supra
note 1, at 77-78; see generally Gorman, Hornik & Woodbury, supra note 8, at 54.
1376 [Vol. 49:1365
1989] MORAL HAZARD, SUPERVISION, AND REQUIREMENTS
implications follow for risk-based capital requirements and supervision of financial
institutions? Four factors operated:
First, the inflation momentum of the 1970s was broken by strong monetary
restraint, widespread recession, and financial stress in the early 1980s for many
business enterprises. This weakened loan asset quality in many sectors, especially
Latin American lending, the oil-patch, grain-belt, and some Western real estate
markets. Then during the economic recovery that developed unevenly in the
mid-1980s, with a vigorous stock market boom that was followed by the October
1987 "crash" or downside correction, many businesses "leveraged-up" and
increased borrowing. This increased the financial vulnerability of many corporate
enterprises and real estate developments.3 5
Second, more banks became aggressive, sought higher earnings, and accepted
greater risks. This was partly a result of "expectational momentum" from inflation
in the 1970s. But bank managers often became more entrepreneurial and growth-
minded, and less conservative in their lending strategies or asset-liability
management.3 6
Third, financial regulators were more relaxed and accommodative to bank
growth, diversification, and higher interest rate earnings expectations.3 7 This outlook
dominated the OCC through the Reagan years, and it gradually became more
influential at the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) as Reagan appointees were added. This
mentality became dominant at the Fed after Paul Volcker was replaced by Allan
Greenspan. The higher interest rate environment also responded to excessive U.S.
budget deficits from 1983 to 1988, although these deficits were criticized by Volcker
and other Fed members. 38 Higher U.S. interest rates were needed to attract foreign
capital and prevent any drastic, unduly rapid, or disruptive decline in the dollar's
value. Further increases in interest rates have occurred during Greenspan's tenure as
Fed Chairman in order to limit inflation, support the dollar, and match rising rates
abroad.
Fourth, the U.S. industrial-manufacturing-agricultural economy, the "base" for
an expanding service economy, grew unevenly in the 1980s with significant areas of
softness. 39 The oil-patch boom plateaued in the early 1980s and collapsed in 1986,
35. See H. KAUFMAN, INTEREsT RAT-Es, THE MARKETS, AND THE NEw FINANCIAL WoRLD 66-80 (1986); W. Lovm-r,
BANKNG, supra note 1, at 73-85; see generally Bock, Hornik & Svoboda, supra note 8, at 61; Gorman, Hornik &
Woodbury, supra note 8, at 55.
36. See R. BRUMBAUG, supra note 10, at 34-36; H. KAuFMAN, supra note 35, at 66-80; W. Lovar, BANKING,
supra note 1, at 126-28; see generally Bock, Hornik & Svoboda, supra note 8, at 60; Caliguire & Thomson, supra note
8, at 1; Gorman, Hornik & Woodbury, supra note 8, at 55; Brumbaugh & Litan, supra note 8, § 3, at 3, col. I.
37. This attitude evolved as a response to increased inflation in the later 1970s, the federal government's difficulty
in controlling deficits in the 1980s, strains for major U.S. international banks, the stock market boom between 1983 and
October 1987, and lobbying pressures from the banking industry.
38. Volcker's warning on deficit dangers was repeated firmly in many public statements from summer 1981
through his resignation as Fed Chairman in summer 1987. See, e.g., Volcker, supra note 32, at 33; see also W. Gr DEmR,
supra note 20, at 668-86; W. LovETr, TRADE, supra note 29, at 227-456. While U.S. interest rates eased substantially
during 1985 to 1986, they moved back up appreciably during 1987 to defend the dollar and attract foreign borrowing,
eased after the October 1987 stock market crash with widespread fears of recession, but moved back up again from the
spring of 1988 through the fall of 1988 to resist inflation, defend the dollar, and attract foreign capital.
39. See INs-rSTM FOR IN'rERNATIGNAL ECONGMICS, supra note 31, at 1; W. Loverr, BANKING, supra note 1, at
79-85; W. LovE-r, INFLATION, supra note 27, at 195-207; S. MARRus, supra note 31, at 5-15; Bergsten, supra note 31,
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with a drastic decline in oil prices. The grain-belt suffered lower prices during the
early to late 1980s with widespread distress experienced by farmers, especially those
burdened with significant debt loads. Further, significant parts of U.S. manufactur-
ing, often referred to as "smokestack America," remained weak, with increased
foreign competition, aggravated by a "high" dollar between 1983 and 1986 and a
trend of plant relocations to low wage countries. These "soft" sectors limited
economic growth and prosperity in many areas.
To the extent wisdom accumulated in bank regulation between 1935 and 1980
(the modern FDIC-FSLIC era), the major risks of bank failure had been associated
with weak management. 40 This included inadequate supervision of departments by
top officers and directors; self-dealing transactions and loans to friends, relations, or
businesses owned by bank insiders; embezzlement, theft, or fraudulent misappropri-
ation; overly aggressive growth and profit maximizing strategies with excessive risk;
unduly concentrated lending portfolios lacking diversification; poor luck in foreign
exchange operations caused by insufficient care to minimize risks; or sizeable losses
on bad checks, endorsements, or guarantees. These were problems of negligence and
breach of fiduciary duties that good professional bankers should always minimize.
Stronger regulation and oversight between 1940 and 1980 helped to minimize these
problems. Bank failures were infrequent and only a modest burden for government
insurance. The U.S. economy experienced broad prosperity and growth between
1940 and 1981 with only short recessions (1948-49, 1953-54, 1957-58, 1959-60, and
1974-75), although there was increased inflation in the later 1960s and 1970s. Due
to traditional bank regulatory success, it is understandable that bank regulators were
unprepared for growing "systemic risks" during the 1980s. 41
During the 1980s, however, "systemic risks" increased substantially for many
U.S. banks. Bank regulators were surprised about various factors including the extent
of "softness" in Latin American-LDC loan portfolios for U.S. multinational banks
after July, 1982; the spread of "softness" in U.S. agricultural-farm loans during the
1980s; the softness in U.S. oil-patch loans in the mid to late 1980s; and the softness
of many real estate-commercial development loans in Western states (and potentially
other areas) during the mid to late 1980s. 42 While Chairman Volcker's speeches
between 1982 and 1987 warned of distortions and strains for U.S. manufacturing
at 788; Bock, Hornik & Svoboda, supra note 8, at 60; Caliguire & Thomson, supra note 8, at 1; Gorman, Hornik &
Woodbury, supra note 8, at 54; Noble, $3.9 Billion Drought Aid Passes Senate on a 92-0 Vote, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9,
1988, at A-12, col. 1; see also S. CoHEN & J. ZysmAN, MANutACTIRiNo MATtERS 59-76 (1987); J. GRUNWALt & K.
FLAEm, THE GLoBAL FACTORY 12-21 (1985); Introduction and Summary, in CoMPErmoN IN GLoaAL IN STRI s I (M.
Porter ed. 1986).
40. See G. BEN sToN, supra note 1, at 1-35; W. Lov-rr, BANKING, supra note 1, at 122-34.
41. For macroeconomic reviews, see, e.g., W. LovErT, BnINsG, supra note 1, at 62-85; see generally C.
HENNING, supra note 1, at 517-52; D. KIDWELL & R. PETERSoN, supra note 1, at 75-77, 535-56; T. MAYER, supra note
1, at 385-99.
42. See W. LovErr, BANING, supra note 1, at 126; W. LovErr, INFILtA'oN, supra note 27, at 195-207; W. Lov Er,
TADE, supra note 29, at 137; S. MARRIS, supra note 31, at 5-15, 170-75; I. SPRAGuE, supra note 1, at 203, 226-33;
Bock, Hornik & Svoboda, supra note 8, at 60; Caliguire & Thomson, supra note 8, at 1; Gorman, Hornik & Woodbury,
supra note 8, at 54; Rodriguez, Consequences of Capital Flight for Latin American Debtor Countries, in CAIArrt. FUtGrr
AND THIRD WoRLD DEBT 129 (D. Lessard & J. Williamson eds. 1987); Silk, supra note 31, at 460-62; Noble, supra note
39, at A-12, col. 1.
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resulting from fiscal indiscipline and excess budget deficits, this did not translate into
tougher bank supervision by the Fed, OCC, FDIC, or for S & Ls by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board. 43 Perhaps, with hindsight's wisdom, bank regulators should have
foreseen the risks of bolder, higher earnings bank growth strategies. But inflationary
expectations were entrenched during the later 1970s and built into world market, real
estate, farm land, and oil-gas prices. While American history had seen major
speculative excesses previously in real estate pricing during the 1830s, post-Civil
War period, late 1920s, and early 1970s, long-term scarcity and locational premiums
did seem to justify a trend of real estate price increases during the 1980s. 44
II. SOLUTIONS TO MORAL HAZARD AND BANKING RISK PROBLEMS
What implications follow for U.S. banking supervision, prudential safeguards,
and risk-based capital requirements? The more obvious "managerial" shortcomings,
including breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligence, clearly deserve continued
oversight and discipline and should be the primary responsibilities of equity capital
investors (and those assuming capital risks through preferred stocks, debentures, and
notes). Improved supervision and strengthened risk-based capital requirements
certainly would help to decrease losses occurring in this area.45
But what of "systemic" breakdowns, e.g., world market disruptions, inflation,
warfare, unexpected scarcities, depression, or mismanaged macroeconomic and trade
policies? Within limits, equity capital holders should expect to shoulder some
burdens in an uncertain world, and risk-based capital requirements partly guarantee
the solvency of banking institutions. But modern macroeconomics teaches that
central banks and treasury ministries should provide ample lender-of-last-resort credit
and appropriate deficit finance or other policy measures to ease "systemic"
adversities. This implies liberal long-term government credits, with substantial
leveraging, to rebuild the capitalization of failed or seriously troubled institutions hit
by substantial "systemic" misfortunes.4
Thus, when "external shocks"-like OPEC I and II (Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries) oil-gas price increases, war mobilizations, significant monetary
restraint to halt previous inflations, and substantial recessions-impact the economy
or cause seriously disruptive interest rate changes that may cause many bank failures,
43. See W. GtRtEtt, supra note 20, at 406-49; W. LoVErr, TRADE, supra note 29, at 137; Volcker, supra note
32, at 31.
44. While some analysts warned that stock prices and PE (price earnings) ratios were too high in the fall of 1987
before the crash, many others were genuinely surprised and still have more optimism.
45. See G. BENsroN, supra note 1, at 175-77, 245-71; I. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 231-64; see also R. DALE,
supra note 1, at 53-70; General Perspective, supra note 2, at 25; Supervisory Issues, in UK BMAN SuPRvIsIoN 46 (E.
Gardener ed. 1986) [hereinafter Supervisory Issues].
46. See G. BNs'roN, supra note 1, at 109-26; W. LovErr, BANKIN, supra note 1, at 51-68, 248-56, 271-76; I.
SPRAGUE, supra note I, at 231-64; see also R. DALE, supra note I, at 207 (references to Lender-of-Last-Resort in Index);
J. GRADY & M. VALE, BRMsH BANNG, 1960-85, at 139-94 (1986); M. REIm, Tim SECONDARY BANKING CRISIs,
1973-75, at 116-19 (1982); Banking Crises andRisks, in UK BANKING SUERVtSION 3 (E. Gardener ed. 1986) [hereinafter
Banking Crises and Risks]; Metealfe, Self-regulation, Crisis Management and Preventive Medicine: The Evolution of UK
Bank Supervision, in UK BANKING SUpEvIstoNI 126 (E. Gardener ed. 1986); Reid, Lessons for Bank Supervision from the
Secondary-Banking Crises, in UK BANKING SUPERVISION 99 (E. Gardener ed. 1986).
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it is unrealistic to expect bank managements and capital owners to shoulder the entire
burden. The Federal Reserve (lender-of-last-resort credit) and various net capital
assistance programs (through long-term loans) instituted in order to recapitalize
troubled or failing institutions are the logical avenues through which the government
can relieve "systemic" adversities. In this way, "systemic risks" are covered partly
by government. 47 Why? Because the failure to alleviate "systemic" financial
breakdowns would otherwise weaken general economic prosperity, disrupt the flow
of investments and credits, and needlessly burden societies that depend upon healthy
banks and financial institutions.
But among bank leaders, equity stockholders and other risk capital security
holders, large depositors, and small depositors, who is best prepared to bear the loss
of bank failures? In other words, what is the best private loss-allocation or
apportionment formula for the problems of bank failure?
Certainly bank leaders and stockholders or other risk-capital security holders are
properly liable for managerial risks when managerial shortcomings are the main
reasons for such bank failures. 48 But what about "systemic" risks? To what extent
should bank managers and capital owners be held responsible for "systemic risks,"
such as malfunctioning world markets, or mismanaged macroeconomic policy?
Further, who, if anyone, is truly responsible for national macroeconomic policies or
the world marketplace? The best solution is to enforce substantial bank capital
requirements (including the new G-12 risk-based capital requirements) to provide a
first reserve against failure and losses by banks and other depository institutions. Yet,
when banks fail mainly because of "systemic risks," the Federal Reserve and FDIC
(or FSLIC) should be generous with recapitalization credits to revive these banks or
financial institutions. 49
47. See G. BENsTON, supra note 1, at 109-26; W. LovErr, BANKING, supra note 1, at 51-68, 248-56, 271-76; I.
SPRAGUE, supra note I, at 231-64; see also R. DALE, supra note 1, at 207 (references to Lender-of-Last-Resort in Index);
J. GRADY & M. WVEAL, supra note 46, at 149-94; M. REID, supra note 46, at 116-19; P. STuDoEsru & H. Kxoos, supra
note 1, at 353-458; Banking Crises and Risks, supra note 46, at 3; Metcalfe, supra note 46, at 126; Reid, supra note
46, at 99. In the midst of widespread banking and institutional failures, a strong policy of extensive emergency credits,
recapitalization, and rescue-salvage operations puts a premium on general results and promptness rather than extreme
tidiness or exactitude of proportional relief. This important lesson is illustrated by the U.S. Great Depression experience,
the British secondary banking crisis of 1973-77, and the widespread failures of U.S. thrifts and agricultural and oil-patch
banks in the 1980s. See, e.g., M. REtD, supra note 46, at 116-19; Reid, supra note 46, at 99; see also R. BRUSIBAUGH,
supra note 10, at 141-44; Nash, Squeeze on U.S. Agency Seen as Result of Savings Rescues, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1988,
at 1, col. 1.
48. See I. SPR, AGUE, supra note 1, at 231-64; see also G. BEsTroN, supra note 1, at 1-108, 235-38. As Benston
and others observed: "Empirical evidence shows that large claims on deposit-insurance reserves have resulted mainly
from two sources: managerial fraud; and desperately risky endgame plays made by client banks that were allowed to
remain in operation long after they became economically insolvent." G. BEasroN, supra note 1, at 236. Thus, the
renewed consensus and increasingly dominant view among banking experts is that reasonable prudential requirements,
including adequate capital and limited risk-related deposit insurance premiums, should be combined with adequate
continuing supervision-so that when banks or similar institutions approach insolvency, they must be promptly closed,
with their assets and deposit liabilities transferred to sound institutions. As Paul M. Horvitz put it: "If insured institutions
are closed before their net worth is totally depleted, losses to the insurance system are small, regardless of the riskiness
of individual institutions." Horvitz, The Case Against Risk-Related Deposit Insurance Premiums, in UK BANGo
SuPRvIstoN 270 (E. Gardener ed. 1986). For a good summary of established officer-director liabilities in financial
institutions, see 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, at §§ 3.2.6-3.4.
49. Responsible, vigorous financial institution regulation policy is really all that Congress and the public expect.
See G. BENSTON, supra note 1, at 109-26; W. LovErr, BANKINO, supra note 1, at 122-28; I. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at
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It seems unfair and totally unrealistic, however, to saddle the small depositors
with any risk of loss for bank failure, either for "managerial" weakness or
"systemic" breakdowns. Saddling small depositors with the risk of bank failure
would merely threaten consumer purchasing power, aggregate employment, and
general prosperity, and impose a burden of inquiry upon innocent families least likely
to understand or know of risks to their bank deposits. Such a policy would merely
restore the pre-FDIC incentives for widespread runs by citizens on banks. There is a
well-established consensus that small depositors should be protected from bank
failure. Due to this belief, post-Depression FDIC deposit insurance is sound
congressional policy. 50
While a few experts urge partial loss exposure for large depositors, "systemic"
and "managerial" risks are very hard to estimate. Reliable information on possible
bank failure is hard to develop, even for bank regulators, and tends to be closely held
in troubled institutions. Making larger depositors pay substantial losses for bank
failures merely would force costly and unreliable depositor inquiries and make
financial institutions much more vulnerable to rumors, large depositor runs, or
malicious gossip (spread even by rival banks). Large depositors under a new loss
exposure discipline would hold themselves poised to withdraw their deposits from
insecure banking institutions and restore pre-FDIC vulnerability to banks and
financial institutions.5'
In fact, no major banking country that seeks substantial international deposits in
the world today could afford to let one of its major banks fail. If it would, its capital
markets would become unreliable to foreign banks, MNCs, and other large
depositors. 52 This is why U.S. bank regulators simply had to bail out U.S. National
Bank of San Diego in 1971, Franklin National in 1974, First Philadelphia in 1981,
Continental Illinois in 1983, and First Republic Bank of Texas in 1988. 53 All
231-64; see also R. BRUJIMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 141-44; R. DALE, supra note 1, at 207 (references to
Lender-of-Last-Resort in Index); J. GRADY & M. NVEAt.E, supra note 46, at 175-94; M. REID, supra note 46, at 116-19;
P. Sr uDNsKi & H. KRoos, supra note 1, at 353-458; Banking Crises andRisks, supra note 46, at 3; Metcalfe, supra note
46, at 126; Reid, supra note 46, at 99; Nash, supra note 47, at I, col. 1.
50. See, e.g., G. BENsToN, supra note 1, at 81-82; R. DALE, supra note 1, at 64-66; J. GALBRAITH, supra note
1, at 134-382; C. GOMNIBE & D. HOLLAND, supra note 1, at 109-28; C. HENNING, supra note 1, at 90-100; D. KioDWELt.
& R. PErERsoN, supra note 1, at 215-18, 415-20; N. LASH, supra note 1, at 22-23; W. LovErr, BANNG, supra note
1, at 55-56; 1 M. MALLoY, supra note 1, at § 1.3.3; T. MAYER, supra note 1, at 22-24; M. MYERS, supra note 1, at
319-21; I. SPRAGUE, supra note 1, at 17-19; see generally J. WELCH, supra note 1; UK BANdNG SUPERVISION, supra note
1.
51. This lesson has been "relearned" by bank regulators in the early 1980s. See G. BENSrON, supra note 1, at
13-15; R. DALE, supra note 1, at 64-66; I. SPRAGuE, supra note 1, at 242-64; Supervisory Issues, supra note 45, at 46.
52. This is the international logic of the Basle Concordats I and It, the main principles of international banking
regulation. See R. DALE, supra note 1, at 172-94; M. MENDELSOHN, supra note 4, at 40-51.
53. For a nearly complete listing of larger bank failures in the U.S. through December 31, 1985, see I. SPRAGUE,
supra note 1, at 109-228. For more recent developments, see R. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 30-36; J. FAUx, supra
note 31, at 1; INsTrrUrtE FOR INTERNATONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 31, at 1; W. LovETT, BANKING, supra note I, at 122-23;
W. LOVETT, INFLATION, supra note 27, at 185-207; W. LovErr, TRADE, supra note 29, at 157-58; I. SPRAGUE, supra note
1, at 252-64; Bergsten, supra note 31, at 770; Bock, Hornik & Svoboda, supra note 8, at 60; Caliguire & Thomson, supra
note 8, at 1; Congress Will Provide, supra note 8, at 307; FDIC Has Become, supra note 8, at 252; Financial Condition,
supra note 8, at 168; Gorman, Hornik & Woodbury, supra note 8, at 54; Packard, supra note 30, at 348; Rapp, Deficit
Limits, supra note 32, at 327; Rapp, House Panel, supra note 32, at 726; Rapp, OMB Fiscal, supra note 32, at 2089;
Reich, supra note 31, at 516; Rodriguez, supra note 42, at 129; Senate Adopts Resolution, supra note 8, at 204; Van
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depositors, large as well as small, were fully protected in these large bank failures.
Although Penn Square Bank, a mere $200 million local bank, was allowed to fail in
1982 and caused loss to large depositors with accounts greater than the current federal
deposit insurance limit of $100 thousand as a lesson to larger depositors, this
disciplinary experiment has been infrequently repeated.5 4 For a good and proper
reason too! If any significant number of large depositors suffered loss in other U.S.
bank failures, the credibility of U.S. institutions as reliable havens for international
and domestic business deposits would be impaired.
Therefore, the only sensible U.S. policy is to require that the main risk of loss
for bank failures continue to fall upon the equity shareholders and related purchasers
of preferred stock, debentures, or notes who accept equity or loss risks.5 5 Of course,
these public stockholders or other risk-capital security holders should sue the top bank
officers and/or directors for any breach of fiduciary duties. More extensive asset data
filings, pledged collateral, or other remedies should be used to strengthen shareholder
relief against bank leaders liable for poorly managed financial institutions. For
example, fraudulent bank officers should not be allowed to "stash" their money in
Swiss banks or other international havens. But the basic burden of proof for breach
of managerial duty must lie with bank stockholders, or the FDIC, FSLIC, or NCUSIF
acting as receivers for bankrupt or failed institutions. 56
A. Implementing Risk-Based Capital Requirements
In the fall of 1987 Central Bank representatives from the G-12 countries (U.S.,
Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, W. Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Sweden) reached provisional agreement on a
new minimum standard for risk-based capital requirements. This arrangement was
formalized in July 1988 with a few additional compromises allowing individual
countries a little more latitude. The Basle G-12 standard strengthens capital and
reserves for most of the significant multinational banking institutions in the world and
establishes a more uniform playing field for the banking industry among the OECD
nations. 57 The basic requirement is eight percent capital for "total risk assets" in
bank balance sheets. At least one half of this capital must be "core capital" (Tier 1),
Volferen, supra note 30, at 288; Volcker, supra note 32, at 31; Walsh, supra note 32, at 1; Brumbaugh & Litan, supra
note 8, § 3, at 3, col. 1; Nash, supra note 47, at 1, col. 1; Noble, supra note 39, at A-12, col. 1.
54. See R. BRUMBAUGH, supra note 10, at 49-56; W. Lov~rr, BANaNG, supra note 1, at 122-28; I. SPRAGUE, supra
note 1, at 242-48; Bock, Hornik & Svoboda, supra note 8, at 60; Caliguire & Thomson, supra note 8, at 1; FDIC Has
Become, supra note 8, at 252; Brumbaugh & Litan, supra note 8, § 3, at 3, col. 1; Nash, supra note 47, at 1, col. 1.
55. These are the general conclusions of most banking regulatory experts today. See G. BEssroN, supra note 1, at
175-79; I. SPRAG&oUE, supra note 1, at 242-66; Flannery, Deposit Insurance Creates a Need for Bank Regulation, in UK
BANKaNG SUPERvtsION 258 (E. Gardener ed. 1986). Some even suggest, perhaps, that double liability might be restored for
bank stockholders in some form. See G. BENMsoN, supra note 1, at 176.
56. See M. MALLOY, supra note 1, at §§ 3.2.4-3.4.
57. See Basle Risk-Based Capital Standards, supra note 11, at 143 (full text of Basle G-12 standards); Fed Staff
Summary, supra note 11, at 232 (Federal Reserve's implementation of Basle standards). For background on Basle
standards, see, e.g., Basle Committee, supra note 11, at 135; Central Bankers, supra note 11, at 101; Fed May Let, supra
note 11, at 79; Malloy, supra note 11, at 75. For background on Fed implementation of the Basle standards, see, e.g.,
Fed Adopts Risk-Based, supra note 11, at 201. For general background on risk-based capital standards, see, e.g., Bardos,
supra note 11, at 26; Keeley, supra note 11, at 1.
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and no more than half may be "supplementary capital" (Tier 2). Low risk assets need
less capital, however, so that many banks might only require six to seven percent
overall capital on total assets, which is already typical for sound U.S. banking
institutions. This new eight percent standard is to be achieved by the end of 1992, and
a preliminary goal of 7.25 percent capital for total risks is set for 1990 as a transition
target.58
Capital is defined rather liberally so that most sound banks in the U.S. and
elsewhere can qualify without great difficulty.5 9 "Core capital" (Tier 1) includes
common stock equity and retained earnings, along with noncumulative preferred
stock. However, "good will" should not be considered "core capital." "Supple-
mentary capital" (Tier 2) includes hybrid (debt/equity) capital securities, subordi-
nated capital debt, and general loan loss reserves or provisioning, all of which are
applicable to U.S. banks, together with "asset revaluation reserves" and "undis-
closed reserves" (hidden retained earnings). (Undisclosed reserves (or hidden
retained earnings) or asset revaluation reserves can be sizeable in other national
banking systems, especially where major long term economic growth yielded very
generous appreciation for some securities and other assets in bank portfolios, e.g.,
Japan during the last 40 years.) But supplementary capital will be further limited at
the end of 1992 in that: (a) Subordinated debt elements should not exceed fifty
percent of Tier 1 capital or two percent of total risk assets; and (b) General loan loss
reserves should not exceed 1.25 percent of total risk assets or two percent of total risk
assets (in other than exceptional and temporary circumstances).
A key to understanding the new risk-based capital requirements are reduced risk
weights for lower risk assets in the bank's asset portfolio. 60 Most important are zero
and twenty percent risk weight categories because banking institutions holding more
of these assets can reduce their effective capital requirements appreciably.
1. Zero Risk Assets
Cash, securities, and obligations of central governments and central banks
denominated in their own currencies, and securities guaranteed by OECD central
governments require no capital because the G-12 agreement determines they have
zero risk.61 This means, for example, that U.S. government T-bills and bonds (but
not state or municipal bonds) are zero risk, along with Federal Reserve, FDIC, and
FSLIC securities issued to recapitalize troubled bank and thrift institutions. This
arrangement supports a steady market for U.S. and other OECD nation government
58. Basle Risk-Based Capital Standards, supra note I1, at 144 (section I) (Basle G-12 standards text).
59. Basle Risk-Based Capital Standards, supra note 11, at 144-46 (section I). But the U.S. implementation is
more liberal in that perpetual cumulative preferred stock may also qualify as Tier I core capital. See Fed Staff Sum mary,
supra note I1, at 232-33; see also Fed Adopts Risk Based, supra note 11, at 201. This is a major relief to large U.S.
multinational banks with reduced common stock equity capital and eases their access to more marketable capital
securities. See supra note I 1 and accompanying text. Subordinated debt is also more readily marketable and serves the
capital risk function well. See G. BESroN, supra note 1, at 179. However, subordinated debt comes under the Tier 2 or
'supplementary capital" classification under the Basle standards.
60. Basle Risk-Based Capital Standards, supra note 11, at 146-48, 152-55 (section II and annexes 2 and 3).
61. Id. at 147-48, 152.
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debt securities. In many nations, of course, banks have taken their own government's
debt for much larger shares of their bank asset portfolios, as many U.S. banks did
during World War II and soon thereafter.
2. Twenty Percent Risk Assets
Securities and obligations of multilateral development banks (International Bank
for Reconstruction & Development (World Bank), Inter-American Development
Bank, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, European Investment
Bank), obligations of banks incorporated in OECD countries, obligations with
maturities up to one year from banks in non-OECD countries, obligations of
nondomestic public sector entities from OECD countries, and cash items in process
of collection carry twenty percent risk weights. 62 This allows easier refinancing and
longer rescheduling of LDC debt overloads, fosters international trade finance, and
does not threaten the widespread network of interbank deposits and lending among
multinational banking institutions throughout the world today. These provisions can
be interpreted as constructively conservative, i.e., strengthening the already substan-
tial growth of global finance, investment, and trade, especially by encouraging
lending diversification and enlarged credits for rescheduling LDC debt obligations.
3. Zero, Ten, Twenty, or Fifty Percent (At National Discretion) Risk Assets
Obligations of domestic public sector entities, excluding central governments
(e.g., U.S., state, or municipal bonds; foreign, provincial, or local government
obligations; and quasi-government companies in the U.S. or abroad) receive risk
treatment according to each G-12 country's national policies. 63 This reflects the
diversity in loan quality of these noncentral governmental obligations and the lack of
consensus for capital requirements in this area. Below normal risk weights for
obligations of domestic public sector entities, however, will facilitate rescheduling
for a substantial portion of existing LDC debt overloads. Further, to the extent LDC
governments guarantee repayment on shorter-term obligations of their public sector
entities up to one year, twenty percent low risk weights can be assured generally
among G-12 creditor banks.64
4. Fifty Percent Risk Assets
Loans fully secured by mortgages on residential property, which are owner
occupied or rented, carry fifty percent risk weights, provided that realistic market
appraisals support these collateral values. 65 In most G-12 countries with high
62. Id. at 148, 152.
63. Id.
64. The 20% risk weight provision encourages more current, responsible, and reliable rescheduling of LDC debt
overloads and allows multinational creditor banks to achieve substantially lower capital cover for loans that can be
rescheduled into this one year or less category.
65. Baste Risk-Based Capital Standards, supra note 11, at 148, 153 (section II & annex 2); Fed Staff Summary,
supra note 11, at 235.
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population densities and secure real estate, this special treatment of real estate
financing seems reasonable. During the post-World War II era, somewhat reduced
capital requirements were logical for U.S. thrifts (S & Ls and savings banks). But
thrifts suffered an earnings-capital squeeze with high inflation from 1979 to 1981,
and at least 500 thrifts suffered a secondary squeeze in the mid to late 1980s with
excessive real estate speculation after partial deregulation, especially in Texas and
oil-patch areas. In present circumstances, when many U.S. thrifts need major
recapitalization, lowering capital requirements for real estate financing could be
controversial and might encourage more banks to offer substantial real estate lending.
But the Fed recommends implementing the fifty percent risk weight for real estate
lending, provided it is limited to first mortgages on one to four family residential
properties, loans do not exceed eighty percent of appraisal values, and loans are not
past due or nonperforming. The fifty percent risk weight will not apply to loans for
speculative property development or construction. 66 '
5. One Hundred Percent Risk Assets
Normal or full risk applies to all other obligations of private sector enterprises,
including obligations of non-OECD banks that have maturities of more than one year,
obligations of governments outside the OECD (unless denominated in a hard
currency and funded in that currency), obligations of commercial companies owned
by the public sector, nonresidential real estate, capital instruments issued by other
banks, and all other assets. 67 Except for the previously listed lower risk assets, the
G-12 minimum capital requirements will be eight percent at the end of 1992 on these
normal risk assets or investments by banks and thrift institutions. Of special interest
is an encouragement for non-OECD countries to denominate some of their external
debts in hard currency and fund that portion in hard currencies to achieve low risk
weight status for participating multinational banks. 68
6. Off-Balance-Sheet Items
Most direct credit substitutes, e.g., general guarantees including standby letters
of credit serving as financial guarantees for loans and securities, and acceptances,
including endorsements with the character of acceptances, receive normal or one
hundred percent risk weights. 69 Eight percent capital should be maintained against
these transactional obligations by the end of 1992. However, limited exceptions of
only fifty percent risk weight apply to: (i) Certain transaction-related contingent items
(e.g., performance bonds, bid bonds, warranties, and standby letters of credit related
to particular transactions); (ii) Note issuance facilities and revolving underwriting
66. Basle Risk-Based Capital Standards, supra note 11, at 148, 153 (section II & annex 2); Fed Staff Summary,
supra note 11, at 235. The 50% risk weight for residential real estate financing, collateralized with secure mortgage
interests, greatly facilitates recapitalization of U.S. thrift institutions and assures adequate real estate financing. It also
encourages banks, to the extent their powers provide for residential real estate lending, to participate in this market.
67. Basle Risk-Based Capital Standards, supra note 11, at 149, 153 (section II & annex 2).
68. Id. at 147-48, 152.
69. Id. at 149, 153.
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facilities; and (iii) Other commitments with an original maturity exceeding one year.
Shorter term commitments or commitments that can be unconditionally cancelled at
any time are agreed to carry only low risk and a nil weight is justified on de minimus
grounds. 70 A risk weight of only twenty percent applies to short-term, self-
liquidating, trade-related contingent liabilities arising from the movement of goods,
such as documentary credits collateralized by the underlying shipments. 71 This means
that many off-balance sheet activities for banks must have eight percent capital by the
end of 1992 for their asset or liability potential, except that lower risk weights apply
to certain banking transactions traditionally carrying low risk exposure for banks.
Whether these lower risk weight exceptions might invite broader or excessive use by
banks will depend upon bank practices and the supervision process for bank
regulators following the G-12 agreement.
B. Problems of Potential Diversification
To the extent banking institutions are allowed to diversify outside fields
traditionally employed by banks for lending, trade finance, risk guarantees, and
secure liquid investments, there is an obvious problem of risk weights. The Basle
G-12 agreements of 1987 to 1988 provide partial guidance, such as assigning low risk
weights for activities that have below normal banking risks. Thus, for fully
collateralized activities such as trade finance supported by documents of credit for
shipment or storage, twenty percent risk weights are acceptable. 72 But it seems
doubtful that much bank diversification could attain such strong levels of collater-
alization or relative security. The major short-term target for diversification by many
large banks is the securities industry, which divides mainly into: (i) Underwriting and
the wholesale marketing of securities, and (ii) Retail brokerage or distribution of
securities to investor families and the management of customer accounts. With
respect to underwriting, the G-12 agreements allow fifty percent risk weights for note
issuance and revolving underwriting facilities, or capital requirements of only four
percent of total assets involved in these activities. 73 Whether this brief, preliminary
statement in the off-balance-sheet list of risk weights could be the final guideline for
all securities activities by banks, bank holding companies, and other financial
institutions, is doubtful. No other G-12 provision applies directly to securities
marketing, mutual funds sales, or other securities activities, except the normal one
hundred percent risk weight or eight percent capital requirements for all other assets,
the ultimate residual category in the G-12 agreement.
In contrast, under current SEC net capital rules (SEA rule 15c3-1), most
70. Id. at 153.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
73. Basle Risk-Based Capital Standards, supra note 11, at 153 (annex 3). But the Fed's implementation, Fed Staff
Summary, supra note 11, at 234, allows unconsolidated bank holding company securities subsidiaries to be excluded from
the bank holding company's capital base and capital requirements. This suggests a Fed intention to let the SEC define
capital requirements for such securities subsidiaries, although a vague provision indicates the Fed also intends some
oversight on "strong firewalls, adequate non-bank capital, and other provisions the Board deems necessary .. ." Id. at
233.
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broker-dealers in securities within the U.S. must maintain net capital (or net worth)
of at least $25,000 and they should not let their aggregate indebtedness (total
obligations) exceed 1500 percent of their net capital. 74 This amounts to a six and
two-thirds percent capital requirement on aggregate indebtedness. Presumably, this
covers obligations to customers for retail brokerage networks. Complex adjustments
for different circumstances can be made under this regulation, which tries to take into
account the downside risks in market value of various securities. Alternatively,
broker-dealers can qualify under rule 15c3-1F, which merely requires net capital to
be equal to the greater of $100,000 or two percent of the aggregate debit balances
attributable to transactions with customers. Most big underwriters and major retail
brokerage chains employ the latter, simpler, and less demanding capital requirement
formula.
Most big U.S. banks and bank holding companies would set up securities
affiliates if allowed by repeal or modification of the Glass-Steagall Act and would
want to qualify for less demanding capital requirements under the SEC rules. The
Fed's proposed version of the G-12 guidelines would exempt bank holding compa-
nies' securities affiliates from the Basle agreement's capital requirements. This would
allow much higher leverage, especially under rule 15c3-1F, for large bank holding
company affiliates than for smaller bank holding companies or independent banks.
This competitive inequality should be eliminated. But what is the best compromise
between the Basle G-12 requirements: four percent capital requirements for note
underwriting and eight percent for other bank assets or obligations, and SEC rule
15c3 with a capital requirement of six and two-thirds percent of aggregate
indebtedness for most smaller broker-dealers; or two percent of aggregate debit
balances attributable to transactions with customers for the largest securities firms and
underwriters? 75
This legal disharmony is illogical and discriminates in favor of the largest bank
holding companies and securities firms. More careful inquiry on this issue by G-12
central banks, securities regulators, and national legislators, including the U.S.
Congress, seems appropriate before any major broadening of securities powers (such
as repeal or modification of Glass-Steagall) is enacted by the U.S. Congress. The
Independent Bankers Association of America (IBAA), representing half of this
country's banks, has taken a strong stand against unequal access among banks to
securities marketing opportunities. 76 For example, mutual funds could easily be sold
74. SEC Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1988); see Haberman,
Capital Requirements of Commercial and Investment Banks: Contrasts in Regulation, Q. Ranv. (Fed. Reserve Bank of
New York), Autumn 1987, at I (good explanatory article); see also Pozdena, Leverage andDouble Leverage in Banking,
FRBSF Wm.ELy L.EnR (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco), June 20, 1986, at I.
75. If major U.S. bank holding companies could shift major portions of their lending activities into the format of
securitizing commercial paper through a securities affiliate, important reductions in effective capital requirements could
be achieved, say from eight percent on full risk assets such as normal commercial loans to only two percent on assets in
a rule 15c3-IF securities affiliate. This loophole could be used to emasculate an important part of the new Basle G-12 risk
based capital standards.
76. See Reform Hearings, supra note 13, at 90-139 (part 2) (testimony of Charles T. Doyle). Lovett, in his House
testimony, also suggested that independent and community banks might need exemptions from bank holding company
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through small banks in small towns, suburbs, and local neighborhoods. Thrift
institutions, including savings banks and S & Ls, if soundly capitalized to the normal
level of banks, could also seek equal access to securities marketing opportunities.
Although underwriting activities are more likely to be carried on by the largest banks
or bank holding companies (except for local municipal bonds and commercial paper
from medium-sized companies), a great discrepancy in capital requirements does not
seem justified between differently sized banking institutions.
Bank diversification into the marketing and underwriting of insurance presents
greater potential complications than the securities field. Banks and bank holding
companies generally have been separated from insurance companies, insurance
underwriting, and most insurance distribution markets by long established custom
and regulatory tradition. The only significant overlap thus far has been the small town
bank holding company exceptions, which allow joint ownership of local banks,
insurance agencies, and realty firms. 77 If banks, bank holding companies, or other
depository institutions were allowed generally to acquire or merge with insurance
companies, significant problems of harmonizing regulatory standards for capital
adequacy, chartering, licensing, reserves, supervision, and accountability for both
bank and insurance company regulation would be presented. 78
While insurance policies could be retailed easily enough by existing depository
institutions with little danger to the public, possibly providing some benefit, this
would be quite disruptive to the existing distribution network for insurance.7 9 Direct
writer sales forces and independent insurance agencies would be significantly
damaged. Already many of these insurance interests have complained strongly
against bank holding companies being allowed to market or underwrite insurance,
which led to the passage of the Dodd Amendment in 1984 by a large majority in the
Senate. There is no indication that this resistance has weakened appreciably since that
time.
Ideally, the door for financial service holding companies to enter into the
insurance underwriting and related pension plan field should not be opened until a
better framework of federal standards for insurance capital, reserves, rates, and
supervision is set up. Frankly, at this stage, neither the SEC nor the "bank"
regulatory agencies (Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, FHLBB (Federal Home Loan
restrictions to participate fairly and equally in marketing mutual funds, municipal and revenue bonds, and other securities
to their customers. See Id. at 201, 221 (part 3).
77. See W. LovErr, BANKING, supra note 1, at 183; J. WrM, supra note 16, at 395-97.
78. See Reform Hearings, supra note 13, at 1-86 (part 3), 96-124, 199-234; see also K. BLACK & H. SKIPPR,
supra note 15, at 568-83; M. DormPAN, supra note 15, at 410-30; G. REIMDA, supra note 15, at 581-98; A. ToBIAs, supra
note 15, at 269-78.
79. For concerns of the Alliance for the Separation of Banking and Insurance (comprising Independent Insurance
Agents of America, National Association of Casualty and Surety Agents, National Association of Insurance Brokers,
National Association of Life Underwriters, National Association of Professional Insurance Agents, and National
Association of Surety Bond Producers), see Reform Hearings, supra note 13, at 96-109 (part 3) (testimony of William
V. Irons). For concerns of the American Council of Life Insurance, see Reform Hearings, supra note 13, at 110-24 (part
3) (testimony of Warren R. Wise). All of these insurance trade associations strongly oppose dismantling the Glass-Steagall
and other legal boundaries between banking and insurance.
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Bank Board), or FSLIC) are currently competent to handle comprehensive insurance
regulation. 80
Conglomerate financial service holding companies, if allowed to proliferate
quickly and without careful supervision, could become vehicles for extensive
corporate raiding, looting, and breach of fiduciary duties in the insurance company
and pension plan field.81 There is a serious risk of misadventure due to the wide-open
80. Almost all insurance regulation in the U.S. is now carried on at the state level of government through their
commissions or departments of insurance. For an introduction, see, e.g., W. LovET, BANKDru, supra note 1, at 338-79.
For more detailed information on insurance regulation, see, e.g., K. BLACK & H. SKIPPER, supra note 15, at 568-83; M.
DoRrm.tsN, supra note 15, at 410-30; G. REJDA, supra note 15, at 581-98; A. TOBI.s, supra note 15, at 269-78.
81. The insurance and pension industry markets comprise much larger aggregate sales, revenues, capital, and assets
than securities brokers or underwriters. See tables in W. Lovrr, BANKIo, supra note 1, at 300, 343, 381, 414,437. See
also Reform Hearings, supra note 13, at 1-86 (part 3), 96-124, 199-234. Hence, the potential profits and bureaucratic
gains for large bank holding companies or large securities firms are substantially greater in the insurance and pension
industries than for simply allowing large bank holding companies and securities firms into each other's markets, or
permitting large bank holding. company-securities firm mergers.
The potential for corporate looting, raiding, takeovers, and breach of fiduciary duties should never be underesti-
mated. whenever financial supervision is weak, abuses can be expected to grow. Certainly the Texas thrift industry in the
early mid-1980s illustrates the potential for widespread fraud, and even looting, when serious supervision lapsed and
speculative mania became fashionable. See R. BRUMBAUOH, supra note 10, at 59, 69; see also Fraud and Abuse by
Insiders, Borrowers, and Appraisers in the California Thrift Industry: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Fraud Hearings]; Bock, Beaty & Woodbury, How
to Rob Banks Without a Gun, Tom, Aug. 15, 1988, at 30.
Corporate takeover activity and raiding have become more fashionable, even though they arouse substantial concern.
See, e.g., Hostile Takeovers: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1987); EcoNoMics DivisioN OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvICE, 100m CONO., IST SEss., REPORT ON
LEVERAGED Buyotrrs AND THE POT OF GOLD: TRENDS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CASE STUDIEs (Comm. Print 1987); J. BROOKS,
Tim TAKEovER GAmE 1-33 (1987); A. MICHEL & I. SHAKEo, TAKEOVER MADNESS (1986); Greenwald & Ungeheuer, High
Times for T. Boone Pickens, Tiste, Mar. 4, 1985, at 52; Greenwald & Ungeheuer, Let's Make a Deal, TLvIE, Dec. 23,
1985, at 42; Jonas, Berger & Pennar, Do All These Deals Help or Hurt the U.S. Economy?, Bus. NVEK, Nov. 24, 1986,
at 86; Nussbaum, Deal Mania: The Restructuring of Corporate America, Bus. \VEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at 74; The Toll of
a 'Nonstop Binge' Five Respected Leaders Assess the Damage, NEswwm, Nov. 2, 1987, at 49. In an overall assessment
of the doubtful, often negative contribution of merger-takeover activity to the economy, David Ravenscraft, a leading
analyst, commented: "Energy, money, and time have been wasted on the merger game that would have been better spent
rebuilding America's industrial base." The Takeover Controversy: Shareholders v. Managers, 7 CATO POL'Y REP. 6, 9
(1986).
Unfortunately, antitrust relaxation in the Reagan era allows much larger concentration in financial markets to proceed
more rapidly. See Reform Hearings, supra note 13, at 50-86 (part 3), 254-72 (testimony of Bernard Shull); Adams &
Brock, Mr. Reagan and Antitrust, in PUBLIc PoLIcY TowARD CORPORATONS 3 (A. Heggestad ed. 1988); Lovett, Antitrust
in the Current Economic Environment, in PuBLic PoLIcY TowARD CORPORATIONS 17 (A. Heggestad ed. 1988); Mueller, The
NewAttack on Antitrust, in PUBLIC PoLIcY TOWARD COrPORATONS 53 (A. Heggestad ed. 1988). But "conglomerate power
is not an optical illusion. It is a matter of public concern and a challenge for public policy.... [it] can lessen competition,
and tend to create monopoly by mobilizing such weapons as cross-subsidization, reciprocal dealing, and competitive
forbearance." W. ADAMS & J. BROCK, THE BIGNESs CoMPLEX 192 (1986).
The potential for a major restructuring and more highly concentrated U.S. financial system is real. There were
influential advocates of such change in high places in the late Reagan administration. See Guttman, Changing of the
Guard at the Fed, CHALt.ENcE, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 4; Nash, Treasury Now Favors Creation of Huge Banks, N.Y. Times,
June 7, 1987, at I, col. 1. Other nations show the recent potential for major consolidation within financial industries if
regulators allow this to happen. In Canada, after major new deregulation, five of the seven largest securities brokers
announced plans to sell large ownership interests to large banks. See Reform Hearing, supra note 13, at 92 (part 2)
(testimony of Charles T. Doyle). In Britain, bear in mind the drastic consolidation of banking that came with no limits
on mergers. Michael Moran summarized British developments as follows:
In the mid-nineteenth century branch banking was highly competitive: new entrants to the industry were
common, banks competed over the rates offered to depositors and borrowers, and there was rivalry over such
services as hours of opening. The amalgamations before the First world War produced a loose and unstable
cartel fixing interest rates for depositors. The emergence of the Big Five in 1918 made this cartel totally
effective, and over the next two decades killed almost every kind of visible competition in retail banking.
M. MORAN, THE POLTCS OF BANKIG 15 (2d ed. 1986); see also, M. CLARKE, REGuLAnING THE Crrv 1-20 (1986)
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access to merger and takeover games in this area. Minimal accountability and modest
regulation in this area would pose serious trouble and invite irresponsibility.
Questionable assets such as junk bonds, low-grade commercial paper, shares in
third-world debt, and the like could easily be dumped into fiduciary portfolios like
insurance reserves, pension funds, and trust account assets managed by financial
service conglomerates. 82 Even though an outbreak of scandals and failing insurance
companies or pension plans might bring later corrective regulation, it would be wiser
to proceed cautiously and limit disruptions.
A serious difficulty is the lack of federal regulation and accumulated expertise
for the insurance industry. Unlike the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, and SEC, which
enjoy more than fifty years of extensive and talented staffing, a network of
well-trained alumni, and side academic support in university economics and finance
departments, and colleges of law, comparable professionalism for insurance regula-
tion is much more limited. Most insurance industry regulatory expertise exists among
the larger companies, relatively few academic departments of insurance, and very
small staffs in state insurance commissions. Certainly the SEC could be relied upon
to represent responsibly the interests of securities underwriters and the broker-dealer
network (National Association of Securities Dealers) in the event of major weakening
or repeal in the Glass-Steagall boundaries, or to supervise bank holding companies
that are allowed to establish securities affiliates. But there is no adequate counterpart
to the SEC for the insurance industry. While insurance trade associations can lobby
with reasonable skill, that is no substitute for a comprehensive tradition of federal
regulatory expertise, Congressional committee staffs, economic studies, and sophis-
ticated wisdom about practices and problems of the insurance industry.83
To what extent are integrated financial conglomerates necessary or desirable for
insurance? Limited experimentation along these lines, carefully supervised to
maintain capital adequacy, reserves, soundness, and fiduciary responsibility might
seem to involve modest risks. But when mergers, takeovers, and displacement
become popular and widespread, financial markets become more concentrated, more
difficult to enter, and the survival of independent and smaller institutions is
threatened. Further, the scrambling together of banking, securities, insurance, and
pension funds will be a dubious achievement. Significant excesses, questionable
transactions, and even looting of funds and reserves can occur easily if complete
(background on the "clubby" traditions of financial regulation in Britain); J. GRADY & M. \EvLE, supra note 46, at
166-67.
82. For concern about the problems of overleveraging and rapid debt growth, along with the proliferation of junk
bonds, see H. KnutmAN, supra note 35, at 34-36; see also Greenwald & Ungeheuer, "Today Things Are Getting Out of
Hand," TtMNE, Dec. 23, 1985, at 51; Of Turf Wars and Junk Bonds, FoRT NE, Jan. 20, 1986, at 8; Sloan, Red Faces at
Morgan Stanley, FoRBEs, July 29, 1985, at 43; Taking Out the Garbage, MoN-v, Jan. 1986, at 13. For discussion of the
inherent difficulty of supervising firewalls between financial institutions, see, e.g., Reform Hearings, supra note 13, at
45-86 (part 3), 235-53 (testimony of Roy A. Schotland).
83. Far more congressional wisdom, regulatory expertise, and talent has accumulated in Washington, D.C. and the
university world about banking, securities, and public finance. By comparison, the insurance industries are nearly terra
incognita in Washington, and the banking and securities regulators (Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, FHLBB, and SEC) are
badly prepared to police and supervise problems in the insurance field. More extensive studies are desirable before any
drastic commingling of banking or securities into insurance is allowed.
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freedom for mergers is allowed before careful supervision and accountability
develops at the federal level.
Of growing concern lately are problems with pension fund reserves, with
increased risk factors for these institutions.8 4 Although the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) mandates substantial, long-term improvement
in funding for pension plans, serious difficulties developed recently. In declining
industries, like steel and other troubled sectors, claims are mounting against the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), especially for defined benefit plans.
More recently, major declines in U.S. stock prices during the fall of 1987 placed
greater strain on some of these and other pension plan reserves. Unfortunately,
Congress must soon cope with these problem areas in the American financial system.
More extensive studies, data collection, and most likely, further reforms will be
needed. Stronger supervision and accountability would be desirable, along with
earlier warning and corrective remedies for depletion and problems with reserves in
pension plans and funding. In any event, however, we should be careful not to
aggravate risks or encourage looseness. It would be unwise to weaken the framework
for oversight of pension reserves and funding whether trusteed by insurance
companies, banks, employers, or union officials. These are additional reasons for
proceeding with caution, ample study, and care not to disrupt existing pension and
insurance funding and reserves.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Strong banking and financial institutions reflect their economy. If a country's
industry, agriculture, productivity, and growth are solid, its financial institutions also
tend to be prosperous. This implies healthy engagement with the world economy,
expanding exports, reasonably balanced trade, and no significant distortions. 85
Undue speculation, serious mismanagement, or irresponsible governmental or
banking finance can cause losses and disruption to the economy. Inflation, recession,
or even depression may follow. In this way, sound fiscal and financial policies and
the general well-being of the economy are interrelated and reinforce each other. Yet
weakness, failure, and misfortune often spread unless they are carefully minimized or
otherwise corrected in a timely and responsible manner.
84. See. e.g., Cahan, The Shrinking Nest Egg: Retirement May Never Be the Same, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 8, 1986, at
114; Cahan & Weiss, The Huge Pension Overflow Could Make Waves in Washington, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 12, 1985, at 71;
Ehrlich, AMF's Agony Over Tapping the Pension Till, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 21, 1985, at 97; Ehrlich, Cahan & Levine, Putting
the Traditional Pension Out to Pasture, Bus. WEEK, May 5, 1986, at 102; Geisel, PBGC Setting Precedent in Returning
Plans to LTV, Bus. INs., Sept. 28, 1987, at 1; Jereski, Some Choice!, FoRBEs, May 4, 1987, at 58; Jereski, The Surplus
Vanishes, FoRBEs, Nov. 17, 1986, at 94; Koselka, Mystery Money, FoRaEs, Aug. 11, 1986, at 74; Myers, Directed
Brokerage and "Soft Dollars" Under ERISA: New Concerns for Plan Fiduciaries, 42 Bus. LAw. 553 (1987); Roberts,
Treasury's Assault on Middle Class Pensions, Bus. VEm, Nov. 18, 1985, at 26; Tasini, Playing With Pension Funds:
What's the Limit?, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 17, 1986, at 89; Weiss, Fat Pension Funds Can Make Companies Tempting Targets,
Bus. VEEK, Nov. 10, 1986, at 106; Karr, Senate Panel Votes Bill That Doubles Concerns' Pension-Insurance Premiums,
Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1987, at 4, col. 2; Get Serious About Protecting Pensions, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1987, at 16, col.
I (editorial).
85. See Reform Hearings, supra note 13, at 42-45 (part 3) (testimony of William A. Lovett); see also J. FAux,
supra note 31, at 1; W. Lovu'r, BANKnoa, supra note 1, at 79-109,422-34; W. Lovm-r, TRADE, supra note 29, at 5-15,
189-225.
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Financial strains of the 1980s for U.S. multinational banks with LDC debt
overloads, agricultural banks, oil-patch banking, and over-speculative thrift institu-
tions, especially those in energy slump areas, were the most serious difficulties for
depository institutions since the Great Depression and the 1930s. These problems
forced a re-evaluation of New Deal era reforms-government deposit insurance such
as FDIC, FSLIC, the recent NCUSIF, and the more limited SIPC (Securities Investor
Protection Corporation), and PBGC (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation), to-
gether with our gradually strengthened regime of prudential regulation and
supervision. 86 The problem of moral hazard, however, has received more attention in
recent years since some insured institutions lack sufficient market discipline against
imprudent lending, speculative excess, and mismanagement.
A consensus seems to be emerging for a better balanced, improved regime of
banking supervision, prudential safeguards, deposit-insurance protection, and risk-
based capital requirements. While global competition for deposits among banks
enforces 100% de facto depositor protection, bank stock shareholders, and the
holders of preferred stock debentures and other securities bearing capital risk, must
shoulder the primary burden for loss due to mismanagement of their institutions. But
bank officers and directors suffer major risks of legal liability arising out of failed
institutions that cause significant losses to shareholders, because they are likely to be
sued for breach of fiduciary duty or mismanagement. Where banks or financial
institutions suffer from "systemic" breakdowns, or from serious weakness in their
regional or national economic fortunes, however, federal bank regulators and
86. See G. BENsToN, supra note 1, at 303-25; W. Lovrr-, BANKING, supra note 1, at 422-56; I. SPRAGUE, supra
note 1, at 232-64; see also Reform Hearings, supra note 13; Fraud Hearings, supra note 81; R. BRUIBAUOH, supra note
10, at 113-80; M. CLARKE, supra note 81, at 161-75; J. GRADv & M. VEALE, supra note 46, at 175-92; C. HENNING,
supra note 1, at 90-98; E. KANE, supra note 10; D. KIowELL & R. PETERSON, supra note 1, at 410-18; N. LASH, supra
note 1, at 102-25; R. LrrAN, supra note 14, at 144-89; M. MALLOY, supra note 13, at § 7; T. MAYER, supra note 1, at
29-38; M. MORAN, supra note 81, at 144-62; Baer, supra note 10, at 56; Baer & Brewer, supra note 10, at 28; Bardos,
supra note 11, at 26; Basle Committee, supra note 11, at 135; Basle Risk-Based Capital Standards, supra note 11, at 143;
Bock, Beaty & Woodbury, supra note 81, at 30; Bock, Homik & Svoboda, supra note 8, at 60; Cabos & Snyder, Optional
Excess Deposit Insurance, in DEsosrr INSURANCE IN A CHANGING ENVIROMENr VII-I (Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ed. 1983); Cahan, supra note 84, at 114; Cahan & Weiss, supra note 84, at 71; Caliguire & Thomson, supra
note 8, at 1; Central Bankers, supra note 11, at 101; Congress Should Concentrate, supra note 10, at 266; Congress Will
Provide, supra note 8, at 307; Cranford, supra note 14, at 2096; Dingell Promises, supra note 14, at 251; Direction of
the Financial Services Industry, supra note 13, at 965; Ehrlich, supra note 84, at 97; Ehrlich, Cahan & Levine, supra
note 84, at 102; FDIC Has Become, supra note 8, at 252; Fed Adopts Risk-Based, supra note 11, at 201; Fed May Let,
supra note 11, at 79; Fed Staff Summary, supra note 11, at 232; Financial Restructuring, supra note 13, at 4; Geisel,
supra note 84, at 1; Gilbert, Silverberg & Watson, Adequacy of the Insurance Fund and Revisions to Assessment
Procedures, in DEosrr INSURANCE IN A CHANGIo ENvIRONME'TI V-I (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ed. 1983);
Gorman, Hornik & Woodbury, supra note 8, at 54; Greenwald & Ungeheuer, supra note 81, at 42; Insuring
Confidence-Deposit Insurance Reform, supra note 10,at Il; Isaac, supra note 10, at 195; Jereski, Some Choice!, supra
note 84, at 58; Jereski, The Surplus Vanishes, supra note 84, at 94; Kane, Confronting Incentive Problems in U.S. Deposit
Insurance: The Range of Alternative Solutions, in DEtrut.A"o FINANCIAL SERVICES 97 (G. Kaufman & R. Kormendi
eds. 1986); Kareken, supra note 10, at 1; Kaufman, supra note 10, at 25; Keeley, supra note 10, at 1; Keeton, supra note
10, at 28; Koselka, supra note 84, at 74; Litan, supra note 14, at 41; Malloy, supra note 11, at 75; Myers, supra note
84, at 26; National Council, supra note 10, at 409; Nussbaum, supra note 81, at 74; Ongoing Divisions, supra note 14,
at 257; Roberts, supra note 84, at 26; Sciacca, Merger of the Deposit Insurance Funds, in DEPosrr INsURANcE IN A
CHANGING ENvIRONMIET VI-i (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ed. 1983); Scott & Mayer, supra note 10, at 857;
Senate Adopts Resolution, supra note 8, at 204; Tasini, supra note 84, at 89; Weiss, supra note 84, at 106; Comment,
supra note 10, at 594; Nash, supra note 47, at 1, col. 1; Brumbaugh & Litan, supra note 8, § 3, at 3, col. 1; Karr, supra
note 84, at 4, col. 2; Sprague, supra note 14, at 28, col. 3; Nash, supra note 81, at 1, col. 1; Get Serious About Protecting
Pensions, supra note 84, at 16, col. 1.
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Congress can be relatively generous with lender-of-last-resort support, and even
recapitalization credits, if necessary. Recent experience clearly demonstrates that
continued and strong bank supervision is essential and that institutions should be closed
or forced into mergers before their losses exceed capital and reserves. Letting insolvent
institutions flounder along, desperately seeking to restore themselves with risky
end-game plays usually leads to even larger burdens and losses for government deposit
insurance funds, like those experienced by the FSLIC and FDIC in recent years. 87
Improved market discipline for banks and thrifts is being strengthened through
the new Basle G-12 risk-based capital requirements. These arrangements enhance
capital adequacy in a fair way, but with reasonable flexibility to reflect more modest
risks for stronger assets.88 Risk-oriented deposit insurance premiums may supplement
risk-based capital requirements within a modest range of fifty, one hundred, or even
two hundred percent of normal premiums. But inherent problems in developing
specific knowledge about an institution's particular situation, along with disclosure
problems, make it impractical to rely exclusively, or even primarily, upon risk
weighted deposit-insurance as a safeguard against mismanagement or undue risk-
taking by bank leadership.8 9 It is also vital to charge all depositors-foreign as well
as domestic-with the expense of deposit insurance since modern U.S. bank
regulators give effective 100% de facto deposit protection for all international and
domestic deposits. In no way can a "free ride" or illegitimate subsidy be justified for
international bank operations.
One complication needs more careful attention. This is the problem of
differential and lower capital requirements (or risk weights) for securities affiliates
compared to banks and bank holding companies. Under existing U.S. law, the largest
securities firms that do most of the securities underwriting are allowed a very low
capital requirement of only two percent of aggregate debit balances with customers.
The normal Basle G-12 capital requirement for banking institutions will be eight
percent after 1992, except for "low" risk assets. If U.S. banks or thrifts are allowed
to form securities affiliates, as many propose today, it is necessary that strong
firewalls be established to insulate these activities effectively from each other. There
is a real and substantial danger that bank holding companies with securities affiliates
could divert much of their corporate bank lending into securitized underwriting
activities through their securities affiliates and thus evade and emasculate much of the
intended benefit from the new Basle G-12 "level playing field" and uniform
risk-based capital requirements for banking institutions. To the extent additional
securities activities are allowed for banks and bank holding companies, it is important
to enforce the new capital requirements fairly for all sizes and classes of banking
institutions, including major multinationals, regional banks, independent and com-
munity banks, together with savings banks and S & Ls. 90
87. See supra notes 33-56 and accompanying text; see also Bartlett, Are Bailouts the Answer, N.Y. Times, Sept.
14. 1988, at 1, col. 1.
88. See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 10-12, 45-60 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 57-60, 72-84 and accompanying text.
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